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ABSTRACT 
 
UFUK: HOW THE U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY MOLDED  
TURKISH ELITE OPINION, 1960-1980 
Feyzullahoğlu, Burcu 
M.A., Department of History 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Kenneth Weisbrode 
 
September 2014 
 
This study argues that the United States Information Agency carried out 
an intense public diplomacy program in Turkey between 1960 and 1980 in 
order to ameliorate the U.S. image among the Turkish urban elite, especially 
among the members of the Republican People’s Party and thus to prevent 
Turkey from having closer relations with the USSR. For this purpose, the study 
contains a close reading of the USIA propaganda material targeting this small 
but influential group, namely Ufuk Magazine and uncovers the image that the 
USIA aimed to create in order “to win hearts and minds” of the RPP members, 
members of Turkish Foreign Ministry of the time, academics and journalists in 
a period of Cold War where the peripheries rather than Europe became the 
target of the U.S. public diplomacy efforts. 
iv 
 
Keywords: USIA, United States of America, Turkey, 1960s, 1970s, 
Republican People’s Party, USSR, Cold War, public diplomacy, propaganda, 
Ufuk Magazine. 
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ÖZET 
 
UFUK: BİRLEŞİK DEVLETLER ENFORMASYON AJANSI TÜRK ELİT 
KANAATİNİ NASIL ŞEKİLLENDİRDİ, 1960-1980 
Feyzullahoğlu, Burcu 
Yüksek Lisans, Tarih Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Kenneth Weisbrode 
 
Eylül 2014 
 
Bu çalışma, Birleşik Devletler Enformasyon Ajansı’nın (USIA) Türk 
entelektüel kesiminin, özellikle de Cumhuriyetçi Halk Partisi üyelerinin 
kanaatinde Amerikan algısını düzeltmek ve böylece Türkiye’nin Sovyetler 
Birliğiyle yakınlaşmasını önlemek üzere 1960-1980 yılları arasında yoğun bir 
kamu diplomasisi programı uyguladığını ileri sürer. Çalışma, bu amaçla, bu 
küçük fakat etkili grubu hedef alan Ufuk Dergisi isimli propaganda 
materyalinin alt metin okumasını yapar ve Enformasyon Ajansı’nın, Soğuk 
Savaş’ın az gelişmiş ülkelerin odak noktası olduğu bir döneminde, CHP’nin, 
Türk Dışişleri Bakanlığının, akademisyenlerin ve gazetecilerin “gönüllerini ve 
akıllarını fethetmek” için kamu diplomasisi yoluyla oluşturmaya çalıştığı 
Amerikan imajını ortaya çıkarır. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The period between 1960 and 1980 can be considered as one of the 
turning points of the relations between the two countries, because the US-
Turkey relations, which had been virtually free of problems in the period 
between 1946 and 1960, became a problematic one due to political crises 
betwen the two countries as well as the changing political atmosphere in 
Turkey, which presented challenges to the way Turkey perceived the US and to 
the relations between the two countries.1 During these years, the US made 
                                                     
1
 The 1946-1954 period was a period of closer and unproblematic relations since Turkey found 
the support it needed in the fields of economic development and security with such 
developments as US Missouri’s visit in Istanbul, the Truman Doctrine of 1947 and the military 
aid provided by the implementation of this doctrine, inclusion of Turkey to the Marshall Plan 
in 1948 providing economic aid besides the military, and closer relations during the Korean 
War. Turkey’s NATO membership in 1952 institutionalized the US-Turkey military relations. 
Between the 1960 and 1980, many crises occured in relations between the US and Turkey, 
such as Jupiter Missile Crisis of 1962, Johnson Letter of 1964, U-2 crises and American bases 
crises between 1960-1965, poppy trade problem of 1970, Cyprus crisis and arms embargo 
between 1975-1978. All these problems gave the United States a bad reputation in Turkey and 
rendered relations between the two countries more stressful than ever. Although the arms 
embargo was removed in 1977, negative image of the US and the anti-Americanism as a result 
remained until the coup d’etat of September 12, 1980, after which Turgut Ozal, who was 
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efforts to fix these foreign relations problems with Turkey, and considering the 
increase in the radical politics in Turkey both in the Left and the Right, aimed 
to eliminate the threat of communism by promoting an American way of life 
and economy especially among the elite class of Turkey, thus creating a 
political environment that favors stronger relations with the US again. 
Therefore, during this decade of the Cold War period, the United States 
Information Agency carried out public diplomacy programs in Turkey by 
publishing a small circulation magazine called Ufuk targeting the Turkish 
urban elite, especially the members of the Republican People’s Party. By 
publishing Ufuk between 1968 and 1973, USIA set out to influence the RPP 
group and other intellectuals in their policy-making decisions so that Turkish 
foreign policy would remain in favor of the US and to prevent this group from 
getting closer to the USSR as a solution to Turkey’s need for development.  
The USIA officers’ account of their time in Turkey and Ufuk indicate 
that the US had an image of Turkey as a deveoping country leaning toward the 
West in its modernization efforts and conducted public diplomacy accordingly, 
strongly emphasizing the possible advantages of following the American 
system in this development process and the aids the US had been giving to the 
developing countries, including Turkey. At the same time, Turkey had an 
image of the US, which was positive for some groups, namely the politically 
powerful democrat (rightist) groups, and negative for others, such as leftist 
student groups. The US worked to change the undesired aspects of its image in 
                                                                                                                                            
known for his sympathy for the US and the free market economy, became the prime minister 
opening a new page for the relations between the two countries. Until the Ozal administration, 
however, as a logical extension of these problems, in order to correct the negative US image in 
Turkey, American diplomatic efforts intensified during these 20 years. 
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the eyes of the Turkish people in order to foster public opinion that would fix 
the aforementioned problems. The USIA chose to target the elite class, 
consisting of journalists, academics and policy-makers, instead of the Turkish 
public per se, since this small group of people were the opinion leaders and 
they determined the foreign policy of the country.  Ufuk was a bimonthly 
journal, which consisted of articles published elsewhere and translated into 
Turkish as well as original articles written for the magazine on various subjects 
ranging from descriptions of life in the US, to the American economic and 
political system, the importance of NATO or even the dangers of 
environmental pollution and solutions to it. As indicated by the selection of 
topics and articles in Ufuk, USIA officers, in harmony with the national 
objectives of the US, sought to keep Turkey among the allies of the US and to 
prevent the spread of Soviet ideology and influence to Turkey. In other words, 
USIA aimed to contain communism in its existing boundaries by making an 
appeal of the US to Turkey. 
In this framework, this study does a close reading of Ufuk Magazine 
and traces the careers of USIA diplomats in Turkey, such as public affairs 
officer Robert A. Lincoln and cultural attaché Leon Picon, in order to draw a 
picture of how USIA presented the US to Turkish urban elite. When we 
evaluate the propaganda material, the picture we get of the US is one that 
represents a model for developing countries with its progressive nature, values 
and lifestyle. While this image was successfully drawn for the urban elite 
population by Ufuk Magazine, USIS officers in Turkey also managed to forge 
close relations with Turkish policy makers and opinion leaders, such as RPP 
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leader Nihat Erim and journalist Abdi İpekçi, although the political 
environment of Turkey, which still contained the same kind of fights between 
the Right and the Left over pro or anti-American sentiments during the 1960s, 
1970s and later, suggests that the USIA was not particularly successful at 
changing Turkish opinion of the US. 
 
1.1 Literature Review 
 
US foreign policy is one of the most studied subjects in the world. 
However, the USIA, which was an integral part of American foreign policy and 
the official information program, has been a neglected part of the 
historiography of US diplomatic relations. Although recently there have been 
studies on the USIA and the US information activities carried out by this 
agency, there is still a huge lack of focused studies on the subject. Since the 
USIA was created by Eisenhower and was a central aspect of Eisenhower’s 
foreign policy, the works pertaining to the USIA activities during the 
Eisenhower administration are more numerous than the later periods of the 
agency. However, most of the early works were written by a few of the former 
USIA employees (or by USIA employees still working at the time), which 
render them not particularly useful because the usual pattern of these works are 
the justification/rationalization of the USIA programs they used to work for 
followed by a section of advice for future employees of the program (or for 
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anyone else who would conduct cultural diplomacy).2 USIA veteran Wilson 
Dizard’s book Inventing Public Diplomacy is an exception in this respect, 
focusing both on the successes and the failures of the agency rather than giving 
justifications for the actions the agency carried out and openly defining the 
USIA as a propaganda operation, albeit with the addition of new dimensions 
such as its wider scope and the fact that it provided the basis of the US 
commercial media’s postwar expansion into global markets. Dizard pointed out 
that USIA activities worldwide helped initiate and/or expand the US media, 
cultural organizations and international trade. This was especially true of 
markets where the US had little or no presence before, such as Asia, Africa and 
the Middle East. In this 2004 study, Dizard also asserted that the scholarly 
study of the role of public diplomacy in US foreign policy was in its early 
stages.3 An examination of the studies that have been added to the body of 
works on the USIA since then shows the same result. The USIA as a scholarly 
subject still needs attention. 
Part of the reason for the lack of studies on the USIA is the Smith-
Mundt Act, which prevented the USIA from going public with its records 
(which were kept in a very random manner anyway due to President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower’s and the first USIA director Ted Streibert’s concerns for secrecy). 
Another reason is the reluctance to admit that the US carried out propaganda 
activities in foreign regions. Propaganda is still an unsympathetic word for the 
                                                     
2
 See Wilson Dizard, Strategy of Truth: The Story of the U.S. Information Service (Washington, 
DC: Public Affairs Press, 1961); Fitzhugh Green, American Propaganda Abroad: From 
Benjamin Franklin to Ronald Reagan (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1988); Thomas 
Sorensen, The Word War: The Story of American Propaganda (New York: Harper&Row, 
1968). 
3
 Wilson Dizard, Inventing Public Diplomacy: The Story of the US Information Agency. 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004). 
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public and for scholars, who tend to opt for the more politically correct term 
“public diplomacy”. Detailed studies of the USIA would require accepting that 
the US government(s)’s activities in foreign regions can be categorized under 
the name of propaganda. This concern contributed to the unwillingness to study 
the subject academically.4  
With the rising interest in the cultural aspects of American foreign 
policy in the 1980s, considered as a period of “cultural turn” of diplomatic 
history, and consequently the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, the interest in 
the USIA has increased as well, although the value of the works conducted by 
historians concerning the area of American public diplomacy was still accepted 
with suspicion. In the 1980s and the 1990s, historians of cultural relations had 
to “justify their work” in Frank Ninkovich’s words.5 When studied, the studies 
were focused almost solely on the cultural impact of the United States on other 
countries, especially on Europe, which was termed in simplistic phrases such 
as “Americanization” and “coca-colonization” offering little agency to the 
                                                     
4
 Nicholas Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American 
Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989. (New York: Cambridge, 2010).The earliest 
studies on the United States public diplomacy and USIA labeled the activities of USIA as 
“propaganda.” Oren Stephens wrote in his 1955 study Facts to a Candid World that the United 
States overseas information programs were propaganda programs. Likewise in 1961 Wilson 
Dizard wrote in The Strategy of Truth that “The United States has been in the international 
propaganda business, off and on, for a long time.” [in Nancy Snow, Propaganda, Inc.: Selling 
America’s Culture to the World, (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2010), 67] However, others 
studying the subject later and USIA officials did not agree referring to the idea that USIA 
disseminated known facts and not disinformation. For instance Edward Murrow insisted on the 
stating the truth aspect of the conduct of their work as follows: “American traditions and the 
American ethic require us to be truthful, but the most important reason is that truth is the best 
propaganda and lies are the worst. To be persuasive, we must be believable; to be believable 
we must be credible; to be credible we must be truthful. It is as simple as that.” (The Edward 
R. Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy, http://fletcher.tufts.edu/Murrow) Nevertheless, as is 
apparent in Murrow’s words too, dissemination of the truth can also be identified as 
propaganda. The distinguishing factor in fact is not the type/quality of the disseminated 
material, but the fact that it is disseminated in order to win hearts and minds on the side of a 
nation and everything it stands for, against another/others. 
5
 Frank Ninkovich, Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-
1950. (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1995), 3. 
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Europeans.6 Although the primary “target area” of American Cold War 
propaganda between the 1950s and 1990s was the Third World, propaganda 
and public diplomacy efforts of the Unites States in those countries remained 
underexamined. Although they helped contextualize USIA’s place in the larger 
cultural emphasis of the Cold War period, even the works of Kenneth Osgood 
and Walter Hixson, who are pioneers in the subject, do not present case studies 
focused on specific USIA programs in particular places and time periods.7 
Nicholas Cull’s 2010 work The Cold War and the United States 
Information Agency provided the most comprehensive study on the subject, 
being the first archive-based history of the agency. However, since the USIA 
was not a monolithic presence and followed different guidelines under different 
styles of management in each country, the need for case studies is evident. 
 
 
1.2 The Rationale for Choosing A History of US Public Diplomacy in 
Turkey in the 1960s and 1970s 
 
As mentioned above, the focus of American public diplomacy in the 
years between the 1950s and 1990s was on keeping the peripheries intact rather 
than dealing with Soviet cultural impact on Europe, but the studies in this field 
                                                     
6
 Michael J. Hogan,  Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations. (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), 9. 
7
 Walter L. Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda Culture and the Cold War, 1945-1961. 
(London: Macmillan, 1997).;  Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret 
Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad. (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 2006). 
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fail to represent case studies of these areas. Therefore choosing a time period 
between the late 1960s and early 1970s in US public diplomacy efforts in 
Turkey only makes sense. 
Case studies of areas other than Europe clarify the way the USIA 
pictured the US and the particular country in which it led public diplomacy 
efforts. In addition, they shed light on the strength and/or weakness of the 
American cultural diplomacy and anti-communist propaganda, and make it 
possible to see the differences and similarities between the USIA approach to 
European countries and to these countries. Therefore this study aims to present 
such a case study on Turkey and to answer questions such as 1) What was the 
image of the US, which was presented to the Turkish elite by the USIA? and 2) 
How were these images transmitted? These questions matter for the larger 
picture of the US foreign policy as well as for an understanding of the US 
relations with Turkey. Examining the USIA experience in Turkey both through 
the examples of propaganda in the region and through what important officials 
of the agency during the time – namely Robert A. Lincoln, Leon Picon, 
Seymour I. Nadler, Kenton W. Keith and Patrick E. Nieburg- had to say about 
that experience gives a better picture of the American public diplomacy 
activities in the region. In addition, having a closer look at the specific 
examples of USIS activities in Turkey, namely the USIS publication of Ufuk 
Magazine, will help to see the content of the U.S. anti-communist propaganda 
in Turkey. Using this case study, this thesis investigates what American values 
the US attempted to transmit to Turkey, the changes and/or continuities in the 
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message and how this message was designed to influence the way Turkey 
perceived the US. 
Also important to note here is that until the year 1960 the party in 
power in Turkey was the Democrat Party (DP), which sought close relations 
with the US for the benefits of American aid in economic development. 
Therefore, the political environment in Turkey allowed such a close 
partnership to flourish between the two countries as well. However, the popular 
support for DP began to deteriorate in 1960, although the party won the 
elections again, due to poor economic condition of Turkey in the form of high 
inflation, shortages of food and slow economic development despite the aid. 
The reaction of DP to the lack of support and increasing opposition was an 
authoritarian approach of tuning out these voices, which ended with the 
overthrow of the DP government with a military coup. At the same time, the 
1960s was a decade of student movements and labor unions in Turkey.8 
According to the USIA report of the year 1966, these socialist developments 
threatened the alliance between the US and Turkey by making the socialist, and 
by extension Soviet, system an alternative that Turkey might want to follow at 
the time of these internal conflicts. 
The 1960s was just as a period when the civil rights and student 
movements were at their peak in the US as it was in Turkey. This enabled 
USIA to associate Turkish political problems with the American ones while 
                                                     
8
 As a result of the hunt for communists in 1970, the student movement came to an end with 
the execution of the leaders of the Revolutionary Student Union -Deniz Gezmiş, Yusuf Aslan 
and Hüseyin İnan- in 1972 and others consecutively, but  a conservative, rightist and pro-
American government was established only in 1983 by Turgut Özal of the Motherland Party 
(ANAP). 
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also obliging them to make an explanation of these movements so as not to 
leave any doubt that these were only temporary and were happening only 
because the US was democratic enough to allow it. 
 
 
1.3 USIA’s Rationale for Focusing on Elite Opinion and Publishing Ufuk 
Magazine 
 
Turkish foreign policy has been traditionally determined by a small 
group of bureaucrats and opinion leaders, in our case by the members of RPP. 
Therefore, USIA’s choice of molding the Turkish urban elite’s opinion rather 
than conducting public diplomacy is logical. This choice also helped determine 
the way USIA prepared its propaganda material. A look at the 1966 USIA 
report reveals that the Agency was successful at reading the current political 
and social conditions of Turkey so that it could adapt its objectives 
accordingly. If we examine the studies of Turkish foreign policy, we can see 
that the USIA evaluations of Turkey are clearly in line with the historical 
realities of the time. USIA knew the basic tenets of the way Turkish elite (i.e. 
policy-makers and opinion leaders) made foreign policy decisions. 
The main tenets of Turkish foreign policy have not gone through 
significant change since near the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and can be 
11 
 
grouped under 3 categories.9 One of these is the legacy of the Ottoman past, 
which gave Turkish foreign policy a realist approach to foreign relations and a 
tradition of keeping up with the balance of powers.10 Although the 1966 USIA 
report did not mention this side of the Ottoman legacy, it elaborated another 
aspect of it, namely the traditional hostility between the Ottoman Empire and 
Russia. Starting with the expansionist policy of Russia in the 17th century 
usually described in Turkish primary school textbooks as Russia’s policy of 
“accession to warm seas,” the two empires became enemies and this hostility 
continued throughout the history of the republic as well, although never 
reaching the point of clashes between the two countries. The fact that there was 
a history of hostility between the two countries made it easier for Turkey to 
continue its tendency to pursue development in Western terms and not to turn 
to the opportunities offered by the socialist system of the Soviets. 
The second basic aspect of Turkish foreign policy-making is the 
strategic importance of Turkey’s geopolitical location. Studies on Turkish 
foreign policy also state that Turkish policy-makers attached (and has been 
attaching) great significance to the geopolitics and strategic location of Turkey 
                                                     
9
 These basic principles  of Turkish foreign policy are the synthesis of many works on the 
subject. All of these works share the same opinion about these basic principles. For more 
detailed arguments on these, see Mustafa Aydın, Turkish Foreign Policy: Framework and 
Analysis (Ankara: SAM Papers, 2004); William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000. 
(London: Frank Cass &  Co Ltd,  2000); Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Keridis, eds., The 
Future of Turkish Foreign Policy. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2004); Baskın Oran, Turkish 
Foreign Policy 1919-2006: Facts and Analyses with Documents. (Salt Lake City: University of 
Utah Press, 2010). 
10
 However, the same studies also talk about the “Sévres-phobia” haunting the Turkish policy-
making in the form of skepticism and caution against other countries. Although it is easy to 
understand the traumatic effect Sévres agreement had on Turkish minds, since the agreement 
attempted to partition Turkey leaving only a small insignificant part of it to the Turks, the 
agreement was never implemented. This “phobia” has led policy-makers to take more caution 
than possibly needed at times, contradicting the realist approach the Turkish foreign policy is 
claimed to have adopted. 
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even at times that this significance no longer existed in the sense that it used to 
due to changes in the system, international politics and technology.11 
Especially during the Cold War, the position of Turkey as a bridge between 
Europe and Asia became understandably important for the success of the 
containment strategy, where the US wanted an examplary country in the 
Middle East that modeled its own system as a buffer zone between the Soviets 
and the Middle East countries. The geopolitical location of Turkey also gave 
Turkey a chance to model the Western civilizations, while also not cutting off 
its Islamic connections, creating a sometimes problematic dual identity as to 
which way to turn at different times. 
The geopolitical position of Turkey also created insecurity in the sense 
that all four sides of Turkey are “surrounded by many neighbors with different 
characteristics, regimes, ideologies, and aims; and that relations between them 
and Turkey may not always be peaceful, and especially in the Middle East, 
may occasionally take the form of armed clashes.”12  
Also creating anxiety over security was the idea that if the Aegan 
Islands were controlled by an enemy power, Turkey would lose its control of 
Istanbul and Izmir harbors as well as the Straits. Cypus was also important for 
the same security concerns. Therefore, Greece’s desire for Enosis received a 
harsh reaction on the Turkish side and the American approach of not protecting 
                                                     
11
 It should be noted here that this geopolitical importance of Turkey was and still is one of the 
most emphasized subjects in Turkish history classes. Therefore, it becomes part of the person’s 
thinking on the subject of Turkey and the place it holds in the world. 
12
 Aydın, Turkish Foreign Policy, 25. 
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Turkey on this issue, the Johnson letter  and implementing an arms embargo 
did not help the relations between the two countries. 
The third basic tenet is Atatürk’s ideology (Kemalism) and its impact 
on Turkish foreign policy. Atatürk was a reformist leader and his domestic 
policies aimed to depart from the Ottoman past, especially on three points, 
namely imperialism, Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turanism. In order to provide this 
departure in the country and achieve social and political reforms accordingly, 
the foreign policy of the country needed to be peaceful. In other words, Turkish 
foreign relations needed to allow Turkey to become politically stable, to 
economically develop and to reach “the level of contemporary civilization” in 
Atatürk’s words. His foreign policy was also strongly connected to his 
domestic policy described by six key principles.13 Accordingly, Kemalist 
foreign policy opposed totalitarian tendencies, hostility towards non-Islamic 
states, unattainable goals such as Pan-Turanism or Pan-Islamism and spending 
the country’s energy for this end, while supporting peace, order, independence, 
democracy and economic development for Turkey. These Kemalist principles 
helped create a foreign policy promoting peaceful relations with other countries 
and a continuation of Western orientation. 
All in all, these three basic tenets of Turkish foreign policy suggest that 
there  is a continuation of the importance attributed to geopolitics, of Turkey’s 
security thinking, of its Western orientation, of its desire for economic 
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development and independence, while the Kemalist ideology changed the way 
Turkey conducted its foreign policy to be more peaceful, avoiding unnecessary 
conflicts for unattainable goals.14 In the works on Turkish foreign policy, 
public diplomacy is non-existent as a subject, indicating a gap in the field of 
Turkish foreign policy studies and stressing the concentration of the power of 
policy-making in the hands of the urban elite, which once again confirms the 
success of the USIA decision of choosing its target population and evaluating 
its conditions and features. The fact that all of these basic tenets of Turkish 
foreign policy were stated in the report indicates that USIA was aware of what 
it was dealing with in terms of evaluating its target’s conditions and features. 
 
 
1.4 The Significance of USIA’s Public Diplomacy Efforts at The Time and 
Beyond in US-Turkish Relations 
 
During the Cold War the traditional balance of power between the 
European countries was replaced by the bipolarity of the two superpowers, the 
US and the Soviet Union. The Cold War era especially required other types of 
contact between the countries. Part of the reason is that neither side of the 
conflict was willing to use nuclear power as suggested by the word `cold` 
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while at the same time making it an element of the indication that they were 
superior in the battle of arms and power. This meant that ideological power 
was not only a part of the battle, but also perhaps the most important aspect of 
it. While the Soviet Union had a program to expand socialist ideology in the 
world starting with the Eastern European countries, the US aimed to contain 
the spread of this ideology, because it would eventually come into conflict with 
its national interests in the form of losing trade partners, military bases, and 
allies, which would mean the weakening of the US while the Soviet Union 
would solidify its power. The US needed buffer zones such as Turkey and 
Greece to stop the spread of socialism, an ideology against the capitalist 
ideology of the US.15 Therefore, it needed to show the people in these areas the 
benefits of choosing to follow the example of the American ideology and 
system over the Soviet one, such as fast economic development and the 
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financial aid the US might offer for it, the freedom of opportunity and self-
determination, or the disadvantages of choosing the Soviet system as are 
exampled in Ufuk Magazine the USIS headquarters in Ankara published, which 
will be analyzed in details in the third chapter. 
In parallel with the national ideology, USIA objectives reflected the 
commitment to the doctrine of containment. As Leo Bogart (1995) explained in 
his study, the main objectives of USIA were fighting communism, showing 
mutuality of interest, building friendship (or at least an understanding of the 
US policies), while the main themes of the propaganda material were 
capitalism, democracy and freedom, which were the three pillars necessary for 
every country to develop. The Truman Doctrine was an obvious manifestation 
of the workings of this ideology and the activities in Turkey clearly reflected 
the US mantra towards underdeveloped countries. In fact, according to David 
E. Krugler, VOA owed the continuance of its existence to the Truman 
Doctrine. Krugler explained in his book, The Voice of America and the 
Domestic Propaganda Battles, 1945-1953, that the VOA was subject to strong 
objections by both the House of Representatives and the Senate and after the 
Truman Doctrine it gained the support of Congress because it was strongly 
associated with the containment policy stemming from this Doctrine. Not only 
liberals but also conservatives started to give importance to the information 
activities of the US, especially after the report of the State Department stating 
that the Soviet information services did not only state “facts” and 
“explanations” of policy but were also disseminating half-truths and sometimes 
lies, resulting in a bad image of the US and the ideology it represented. 
17 
 
Therefore Krugler took the Truman Doctrine as the pushing force of expansion 
of the US information activities, whose first areas of expansion were Greece 
and Turkey, and the containment policy as its underlying ideological 
framework.16 
From the receiving end, namely Turkey, we see a need for a powerful 
ally that could support the newly established country, geographically between 
the Soviet Union, Europe and the Middle East, in its Westward-looking 
modernization efforts and economic development. As said before, Turkey, with 
its traditional hostility towards Russia and historical Western-orientation, 
found this ally in the US. The public and state opinion over the perception of 
the US in Turkey changed during different time periods and under different 
governments, but the US remained an important ally over the years thanks to a 
similar calculation of pros and cons. At this point, it is also important to note 
that the Soviet information programs were highly financed and intense, which 
stood as a threat for at least the credibility of the U.S., therefore making it 
essential to keep up with the communist efforts of information and 
propaganda.17 
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CHAPTER II 
 
USIA PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES IN TURKEY 
BETWEEN 1960 AND 1980 
 
 
2.1 A Brief History of US Cultural Diplomacy Activities in Turkey 
 
The US cultural diplomacy activities in Turkey officially began in 
1943, when “the formal title of cultural relations attaché first appeared on State 
Department diplomatic lists. The first appointments included a cultural attaché 
in Ankara.”18 In 1947, the Truman Doctrine was implemented in order to 
provide help to countries who were resisting political subversion from internal 
or external sources. With the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, the US 
initiated information programs in Greece and Turkey.19 Voice of America 
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added a Turkish language broadcast in December 194920 and the ship Courier 
was given the charge to transmit broadcasts in 9 languages in the Middle East 
including Turkish in 1952.21 
Although Truman’s presidency gave more funding and expansion to the 
US information and propaganda activities around the world, increasing the 
USIA posts called USIS to 88 and the VOA languages from 23 to 46, the 
information and propaganda activities during this period were short-term and 
more militarized (aggressive) opting for psywar operations, which did not 
contribute to the longer term relations between the US and the countries where 
the USIS posts had been established. In 1953, Eisenhower appointed William 
Harding Jackson to run the Committee on International Information Activities 
(also known as the Jackson Committee) to evaluate the psywar operations, 
which had been initiated by the Truman administration. During his tenure, the 
structure of the information and cultural diplomacy activities changed. As a 
result of the evaluations, “The Jackson committee … recommended abolishing 
the Truman-era Psychological Strategy Board as part of a general policy of 
downgrading the role of psychological operations in any quick-fix attempts to 
turn back Moscow’s aggressive international actions”22 meaning the US 
information activities would turn to a more long-term outlook. There would be 
an emphasis on cultural relations as well. Therefore, the operations were 
reconstructed, with covert operations being given to the CIA and overt 
operations including the USIS posts and the VOA staying under the 
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International Information Administration (IIA). After being subject to four 
investigations, the program was given independent bureaucratic status and the 
USIA was created in this way. Finally, the agency’s activities were checked by 
the State Department and were given a voice in the National Security Council, 
therefore supposedly strengthening the role of public diplomacy in American 
foreign policy. However, this role was never fully achieved, and the USIA 
mostly remained a tool for implementing foreign policy decisions, rather than 
being a factor in decision-making.23 
 
 
2.2 USIS Objectives and Activities in Turkey 
 
In order to understand the activities of USIS Turkey, we should 
examine the general framework this office worked in, the objectives defined by 
the Agency and the target of the American public diplomacy efforts. The report 
by Office of Policy and Research of USIA entitled “Attitudes and Values 
Confronting Current USIA Objectives in Turkey” dated October 1966 
indicated that USIA was particularly disturbed by the domestic political and 
ideological changes in Turkey and the Turkish drive for more independent and 
multilateral foreign relations giving up on its former foreign policy position of 
having the US as its strongest and closest ally. Especially the latter change was 
of particular concern for USIA, which claimed that “the principle obstacle 
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confronting the Agency’s program is the current political movement away from 
“overcommitment” to the US and the West and toward a more neutral, 
independent posture.” The report warned that “In the 1950’s when the 
Menderes regime was in power and the Cold War was at its most extreme US-
Turkish relations were the most friendly. Today it is obvious that the 
honeymoon is over. The pendulum is swinging against us.”24 While the report 
accepted that not everything could go back to its past status in terms of the 
relations between the two countries, it also suggested that “the erosion of 
attitudes favoring a close relation with the US... may be significantly 
inhibited.”25 Therefore, USIA tuned its efforts to eliminate the threats posed 
against a close relationship between the US and Turkey. 
While USIA was disturbed by these changes and saw the need to act 
upon them, the report concluded that these changes did not mean that Turkey 
was undergoing a fundamental change in terms of political and social values, 
therefore they did not need to be alarmed by the changes: 
Until such time as this present trend crystalizes, the US image 
may decline still further. Despite this, and barring a drastic 
development, there is no reason to believe that Turkey’s basic political 
and social identification with the West will be altered. The present 
situation offers a challenge to USIA activities in Turkey that is more 
difficult than ever before.26 
 
In order to meet this challenge, the objectives of the USIS needed to be 
adapted to the changing attitudes and values of the target group. The objectives 
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of the USIS and the themes related to these objectives were as such according 
to the report: (1) increasing public, particularly elite, awareness of the 
advantages of US-sponsored mutual security institutions, especially of NATO, 
(2) increasing the understanding of the advantages of Turkey’s cooperation 
with the US and Europe, (3) and reminding the Turks of the continuing dangers 
of communism. 
The question of whether or not USIS in Turkey acted in line with these 
objectives can only be answered by accounts of their activities during the time 
period. We can obtain most of the information on the inner workings of USIS 
in Ankara by examining a collection of interviews with the veterans of USIS 
carried out by the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training (ADST) 
and digitized by the Library of Congress. The interviews of such diplomats as 
Robert A. Lincoln, Leon Picon and Kenton Keith reveal the actual workings of 
the USIS post in Turkey, drawing a picture of the way the officers in the field 
conducted public diplomacy. Although  “their personal recollections and 
opinions are not official statements of the U.S. Government or ADST and 
interviewees have agreed not to divulge classified information,” as the Library 
of Congress overview of the collection states “this restriction makes the 
transcripts no less edifying or entertaining. These interviews offer more than 
individual personal perspectives on the formulation and implementation of 
23 
 
American foreign policy.”27 In fact, they offer insight into how the diplomatic 
work was actually carried out. 
The above-mentioned 1966 report defined the USIS target group as “the 
politically frustrated elites of the RPP” whose position was one of favoring a 
“guided democracy” and “who tend to interpret such actions as US aid efforts 
to assist in Turkey’s modernization as attempts to side with their political 
opponents, whom they characterize as ‘American stooges’.”28 It is also 
important to note here that “on the political scene the opposition RPP has had 
only limited success, but it is able to hamstring JP government decisions since 
it still controls much of the bureaucracy.”29 Therefore, the urban elite group 
represented by RPP remained the most important target group for the USIS. In 
the interview done by G. Lewis Schmidt on April 19, 1989, Robert A. Lincoln, 
who was the Public Affairs Officer of USIS Ankara between 1965 and 1970, 
asserted several times that since they wanted to appeal to RPP together with 
Leon Picon, Cultural Attaché of USIS Ankara in 1968, the USIS post carried 
out “a definite left-of-center program. Our basic theory was that somehow or 
other within a few years the leftist party, the Republican People’s Party… 
would come into power.” He said that the Embassy had strong relations with 
the RPP between 1960 and 1965, and did not know the Justice Party well, 
because in 1960 Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes was unseated by the 
military, which was “pretty much in the left”, and Bülent Ecevit of RPP came 
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into power. However, in 1965 Süleyman Demirel was elected the prime 
minister, so in this period, “the embassy and CIA had the closest imaginable 
contacts with Demirel and the Justice Party. They apparently did not know the 
RPP very well.” 
Lincoln praised the ability of the USIS to have strong connections with 
the right persons at the right time unlike the American Embassy and CIA, who 
in his opinion focused only on the current government in power. Estimating the 
victory of the RPP in the coming years, USIS did not let their relations with the 
RPP group deteriorate during Suleyman Demirel’s administration. Rather the 
USIS diplomats had personal contact with the RPP members. For example, 
Lincoln was good friends with the RPP leader Nihat Erim, who was 
assassinated in 1980. Lincoln recalled the times when “approximately half of 
the cabinet were people we knew one way or another. I remember several of 
them telephoned Catherine (his wife) to let her know: ‘Guess what, I’ve just 
been installed’ and that sort of thing.” He explained the favorable USIS 
tendency towards the RPP on the grounds that RPP was not extremist and was 
preferable to an extremist group:  
The RPP in early 1971 was, first, pretty much unknown to the official 
United States except for USIS and, second, socialist very definitely, but 
moderate socialists. The majority weren’t the far left socialists. I felt 
that this was beneficial to the Unites States in this case. They were 
about to come in and I would rather see the moderate socialists come in 
than the violently anti-American socialists of the far left. 
 
Therefore, Lincoln explained the role of the USIA as maintaining good 
relations with the Turkish political parties, but not controlling the direction of 
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the politics. According to his account, the USIS only observed the political 
atmosphere in Turkey and predicted a future outcome, which suggested a 
continuity of relations with the RPP, and acted accordingly. He claimed they 
saw the positive results of their policy when they had forged close relations 
with half the cabinet members and the Prime Minister Erim as a close friend. 
As Lincoln said: “Finally, the USIS left-of-center program worked. We were 
doing the right thing. There wasn’t any question, so if you ask whether USIS 
had an impact, yes, we had a huge impact at that time in Turkey,” although he 
did not go through the details or the explanation of what kind of impact they 
made. One can only deduct the expectation that the USIS had of more 
favorable opinion of the Erim administration for the US, since apparently the 
administration did not have personal biases or negative feelings for the US or 
Americans. It is however not possible to find proof or indications for Lincoln’s 
claims on this point. 
The ‘left-of-center’ program Lincoln and Picon carried out was “meant 
to appeal to the upper intellectual levels in the foreign ministry, the academic 
world, the media and so on.” As Thomas Sorensen, another USIA veteran and 
one of the earliest writers on the agency, asserted that the USIA activities were 
not “easily identifiable ‘world public opinion’ per se, but influential people’s 
opinion in each country, which affects their government’s opinion.”30 He 
suggested that the US needed to make propaganda to influence these influential 
people, because just giving information would not be enough to convince 
people who otherwise tended to think that the US was only interested in saving 
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itself due to the heavy Cold War terminology that had been used for years.31 
The USIA diplomats, according to Sorensen, needed to make a case for the US 
and be an advocate of that case, therefore persuade people with an organized 
and deliberate effort. Lincoln and Picon were doing just that. As a part of their 
persuasion efforts, Lincoln said, together they eliminated a mass appeal 
magazine, of which we are not given the name, which they found as unserving 
or at odds with their purposes and replaced it with a magazine which was 
edited by Picon himself. Thinking that one of the duties of the USIA should be 
publishing this kind of magazines in order to inform the public, this does not 
sound interesting, but actually this was not a usual practice for the USIS posts, 
because the USIS magazine in Ankara came out of the cultural section of the 
agency, not the information section, which dealt with this job in all other 
countries. Lincoln explained, “I don’t believe that the only USIS publication in 
any USIS country post before had been one that came out of the cultural 
section. Rather, basic publications normally came out your information 
section.” This shows that first of all as the directors of the cultural section, 
Lincoln and Picon felt the need to undertake such an initiative relying on their 
experience in the country and on their experience with Turkish people (mostly 
the political and opinion leaders). In addition, this indicates that the 
propaganda and information activities of the USIS Ankara at the time were 
being carried out on a personal level and with personal initiatives, making 
decisions as they went, and according to the circumstances of the country and 
of the time period, rather than following a set of strict plans and guidelines 
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from Washington. This is not to say that the USIS post was acting by itself 
without communicating with Washington of course, but it means that it had the 
liberty and elasticity needed to carry out cultural diplomacy. 
The magazine USIS started to publish in 1967 was called Ufuk 
(meaning “horizon”) and it was published locally, unlike other magazines of 
this type, which had been published at the Regional Service Center in Beirut. 
Lincoln explained that  
our goal then was to publish a magazine which would carry only 
translations of U.S. works from intellectual publications. By intellectual 
I mean everything from Kenyon Review to Harper’s to the New York 
Times magazine. The agency was very cooperative. USIA would make 
arrangements to get the approval for us to use an article. We published 
about six articles per issue. The magazine came out every month 
 
 with a small circulation of 1500. The target reader of the magazine was 
the intellectual class as said before:  
selected people from the academic world; all universities- Ankara, 
Izmir, Istanbul, people from the foreign ministry, because the foreign 
ministry had tremendous power in the country, as you may recall; 
people from the government as a whole - - but, again, individually 
selected; certain people from the media, selected writers, and so on. 
 
 According to Lincoln’s account, the magazine did achieve its purpose 
by creating the necessary connection and relations with the intended people. 
Lincoln said that “for example, one of the men who liked the magazine very 
much and became practically an advisor was the editor of the daily newspaper, 
Milliyet. Milliyet was powerful then” especially among the members and 
supporters of the RPP. The editor Lincoln mentioned was Abdi İpekçi, who 
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was one of the biggest journalists in Turkey. Lincoln described their relations 
with Abdi İpekçi and his foreign editor Sami Kohen as such: “İpekçi was an 
intellectual leader. It took us about two years to get to know İpekçi very well. 
He simply didn’t like Americans but he gradually became a rather good friend. 
Sami Kohen, the foreign editor, was the opposite. Sami liked Americans… He 
was the stringer for Newsweek.” Therefore, Lincoln indicated that the USIS 
had good relations with the media, and one of the most influential newspapers. 
However, it is not possible to prove the perks of this relationship through the 
writings of İpekçi, who kept the same balanced perspective on the US and its 
actions. The opinion of İpekçi over the US does not seem to be either anti or 
pro-American, since he frowned over such American foreign relations blunders 
as the Johnson Letter, he did not seem to oppose the US on ideological grounds 
stressing over the American political, social and economic harmony and its 
technological strength. If we are to discuss the changes of İpekçi’s opinion of 
the US, we can actually talk about a change for the worse, since his writings 
not only failed to reflect the friendship Lincoln claimed, but also expressed 
more and more anger towards the US, including such adjectives as 
“inexperienced and injudicious”32 and “emotionally carried away”33 for the 
attitude of the US over Cyprus and poppy production problems. Perhaps this 
was due to the separation of the two spheres of politics and friendship, which 
PAO Patrick E. Nieburg (1977- 1978) talked about in his February 4, 1988 
interview to Allen Hansen:  
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I found the Turks to have a political culture which is absolutely 
superior… in many places where I have served if there was a political 
animosity or disagreement this was carried over into personal life. I 
found that in Turkey you could have serious political differences and 
still maintain a personal relationship which was warm and friendly. 
 
Apart from the magazine, whose target audience was the intellectual 
circle, the USIS in Turkey did not deal extensively with other publications. 
Leon Picon suggested Turkey was not a reader country, so the USIS did not 
have a major book translation program in Turkey. Picon said that they only 
dealt with “neutralizing” some popular Marxist books. For example, Doğan 
Avcıoğlu’s Türkiye’nin Düzeni was  
straight out the Marxist economic approach to the needs of Turkey. 
Hard hitting, nearly violent in its statements about what was wrong with 
what’s going on. Of course, this was a book that the students seized 
upon… we aimed our sights at neutralizing this single book…by 
making available books from the American point of view. With some 
success. But the book program was nothing very much, as was proper, 
in Turkey. 
 
Finally in 1977, USIS Istanbul began to run a book translation program as told 
by Patrick E. Nieburg in his interview to Allen Hansen on February 4, 1988. 
As with the book program, Picon gave huge importance to providing 
Turkish people with the American point of view. He was in charge of the 
Fulbright program and he regarded the exchange program as an introduction to 
American values and culture. About the program he said that it was “out of 
balance. About 80 per cent of our funds went into sending Turkish students to 
the United States” and the fields that these students were in did not actually 
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serve the purposes of the program according to Picon. One of the reasons of 
this was 
the presence of the Turkish Foreign Ministry in the Fulbright 
program… They tended to regard the Fulbright program - - wrongly, I 
believe- as an instrument for building up expertise in the hard sciences 
and developmental subjects… In terms of our interest in mutual 
understanding, I’m sure that those things did a bit of good, but they 
would not match up at all with sending Turkish students to the United 
States to study American thought, American concepts of democracy, 
the social sciences in various forms. And that in turn would not make 
the contribution nearly that sending a Turkish professor in the social 
sciences field to an American university would make. 
 
 Therefore, he worked to balance out the Fulbright program. In his 
interview, he made a comparison of his experience in Turkey with Japan, 
where he had worked before coming to Turkey, saying that  
to a satisfactory degree I was able to develop the same kind of dialogue, 
again, between American scholars who came to Turkey and Turkish 
scholars. I always regarded that as probably the most important phase of 
the operation. On the other hand, I became much more deeply involved 
with the people in the artistic world in Turkey than I had in Japan, 
though my involvement in Japan was pretty much. It was sort of a shift 
in emphasis.  
 
The shift of emphasis moved towards theater, because the left “was 
making inroads into the field of theater.” Therefore, the USIS carried out a 
theater program, which made translations of American plays and musicals such 
as Fiddler on the Roof, Man of LaMancha and My Fair Lady. Picon would 
have Turkish people translate these first, Lincoln said. Sometimes there would 
be problems with the content of the plays. For example,  
the gentlemen on the left in Turkey took exception to Fiddler on the 
Roof and regarded this as a piece of propaganda in that it was anti-
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Russian and, they said, needlessly so. And they took exception to the 
State Theater’s putting this thing on. The director of the state theater, a 
man by the name of Cüneyt Gökçer, was interviewed on television 
about the criticism that he was facing. I was very pleased with his retort 
when he was asked about this. He said, ‘You regard me as a 
propagandist for the United States because of Fiddler on the Roof? 
You’ve seen me do Julius Ceasar. Was I then a propagandist for 
Rome? You’ve seen me do Hamlet. Was I a propagandist then? And if 
so, for England or Denmark?’  
The musical was a success for the purposes of the US. As Picon suggested: “I 
can say that the overall impact of Fiddler on the Roof in Turkey was one of 
deepening distrust for Russia. And there was plenty of distrust before I got 
there, but did deepen it further.” 
Kenton W. Keith, Cultural Attaché to USIS Istanbul between 1968 and 
1972, also mentioned the American influence in the field of theater in his 
interview to Charles Stuart Kennedy on June 4, 1998:  
There was an extremely active cultural life in Istanbul, and American 
culture was highly respected… Successful Turkish adaptations of 
American plays were regularly seen. James Baldwin directed Fortune 
and Men’s Eyes in the theater of his friend, Engin Cezzar. There was 
everything from Hair to Man of La Mancha. Most of these cultural 
figures were on the left, and they were opposed to our involvement in 
Vietnam and other American policies and actions, but that didn’t 
prevent me from forging some very close relationships that have 
endured over the years. 
 
Then he went on to say that: 
The theater in Istanbul was a major venue of Political debate and 
activism. A lot of politics were acted out on stage and plays were 
chosen by directors and theater-owners because of the political message 
they conveyed. Plays were written by politically engaged Turks. It was 
my purpose to try to promote as much contact as I could with those 
institutions and we did a lot. We routinely obtained the rights to 
translate American works, financed translations, brought in specialists 
in stagecraft, and even had a major American theater figure, Art 
Housman, spend a year in Istanbul as a kind of free-floating consultant. 
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He also explained how he helped create a political science program at 
Istanbul University, where he arranged distinguished American political 
scientists such as Lucian Pye and Daniel Lerner to give lectures, discussions 
and consultations at the university. He claimed he sent most of the young 
professors at the department to the US on a Fulbright grant or an international 
visitor program. He expressed how strongly he believed in the benefits and 
powers of these cultural programs carried out by USIS. However, just as 
Lincoln, he did not really explain how to prove their effects: “Turkey was… 
where I really found out how potent the kind of work we do can be… We used 
cultural programming and educational exchange as the fundamental building 
blocks of our activity in Turkey. I sincerely believe that we can prove – if any 
proof be needed – how indispensable this kind of work can be.” 
Leon Picon also talked about the binational centers in Turkey at the 
time. There were 4 binational centers in Turkey, one in Izmir, one in 
Iskenderun, one in Istanbul and a larger one in Ankara. The directors of these 
centers were American, however, the Board of Governors and the President of 
the Board of Directors had to be a Turk by Turkish law. The President of the 
Board controlled the activities of the Center Director, who was American. 
Picon said that they did not always run smoothly with the Turkish president 
and the Turkish board: “he took quite a bit of exception to some of the things 
we were doing at times… the Turkish members of that Board considered it an 
important thing to be very active in controlling the activities of the Binational 
Center. Fortunately, in most cases, the problems were administrative rather 
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than in terms of content.” These centers had libraries, which served Turkish 
people for long years and Picon said that Turkish librarians were “bright.” He 
was “very impressed that they included [in the list of order recommendations] a 
lot of hard hitting stuff and they really wanted that in the library.” Another 
program being held at the centers was an English language program, which 
was a huge success: “Those programs attracted many more people than we 
could actually handle. Everybody wanted to learn English. I think the English 
language teaching program is a very worthwhile activity of USIA.” 
All in all, the interviews of the officers reveal that there was an 
emphasis on the American influence over Turkish arts, theater being the major 
area of influence, while there was no mention of cinema or music. The aim of 
the USIA in Turkey as explained by these former officers was to build relations 
between the institutions of Turkey and the US, which indicates a focus on the 
influential people, the academic circle and the policy-makers as a target for the 
US public diplomacy efforts. This was stated in both Kenton Keith’s and 
Patrick E. Nieburg’s interviews in order as such: “trying to form effective 
relationships with the institutions that had been essentially closed to the US,” 
and “the most important job there was to build institutional bridges between 
Turkish and American institutions.” It should also be noted that we do not have 
any interviews with the officers who worked in Turkey between the years 1972 
and 1980, leaving nearly a decade of the time period of the thesis in the blind. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF UFUK 
 
 
Ufuk Magazine, the USIA publication between 1968-1973, was the 
primary propaganda material of the USIS Turkey programs. Although USIA 
conducted public diplomacy, the target audience of the magazine was not the 
public per se, but the elite, including academics, bureaucrats, government 
representatives, journalists, etc. The magazine started by stating that the 
articles reflected the authors’ own opinions and not necessarily the opinion of 
the US government, which would possibly grant more accountibility and trust 
to what was written. Although diverse in topics, Ufuk Magazine reflected more 
of an emphasis on the military alliance, followed only by economic relations in 
importance. There was particular emphasis on alliance through NATO and 
with this alliance bringing peace to the World. America is portrayed as the 
major responsible party for this peace, while the Soviet Union is reflected as 
the major obstacle to a peaceful world. 
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The articles almost always commented on one or more of the following 
values: democracy, individualism, optimism, and progress (progress being the 
key element here). The US was reflected as a country where everything gets 
better in time and in a rapid manner. Emphasis on the youth and education of 
the youth is one of the key elements of this American image of progress.  
Another reason of this emphasis in the form of student movements is the 
tremendous activity of student groups in Turkey especially in 1968 as in all 
around the world.  
When all the articles of the Ufuk Magazine are considered, three general 
aims of the USIS Turkey seems apparent: 1) providing an accurate image of 
the US and fighting with anti-Americanism, 2) anti-communist/anti-Soviet 
propaganda and the defense of the capitalist system, and 3) cultivating a 
conciousness of a global world. The three aims of the magazine will be 
explained by the examples below. 
 
 
3.1 Providing an Accurate Image of the US and Fighting with Anti-
Americanism 
 
One of the three main purposes of the USIA was to provide an accurate/fair 
image of the US and to fight with anti-Americanism in the target country. In 
order to do that, USIA needed to explain the US in a way that matched the 
interests of the US whether it be protecting the free world from the influence of 
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communism or to obtain a mutual understanding between the US and the target 
country. This explanation included American values, institutions and past and 
present actions of the US (diplomatic, economic and military). 
The content of Ufuk Magazine in pursuit of this aim can be categorized in 6 
sections, which are (1) economic development and the presentation of the US 
as a model (2) American Dream and American exceptionalism and the 
American character (3) democracy (4) justification of the American 
interventions and presence in Europe and developing countries (5) defense 
against issues of racial segregation and discrimination (3) the youth and 
explanation of student activism. 
 
3.1.1 Economic Development and The Presentation of The US as a 
Model 
 
The necessity of emphasizing this theme in USIS material was stated in 
the Office of Policy and Research Program Action Memorandum in December 
1966 for adapting the USIS programming in Turkey to the recent erosion of 
Turkish attitudes favoring close US-Turkey relations: “Given the social and 
economic over-expectation of the younger generation, USIS output should 
probably reflect the fact that progress, regardless of political ideology, is a long 
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term haul, that it would be no faster under Communism and would be achieved 
at the cost of individual freedom”34  
The articles under this category in the magazine almost always insist on 
the long term nature of economic development, although the magazine went 
further by showing the US as an example of the system to adopt if a country 
wanted to achieve economic development. Throughout the content of the 
magazine there are many examples of the presentation of the US as a model for 
other countries, especially for underdeveloped/Third World countries. For 
instance, in the very first volume of the magazine, the article “Creation of a 
National Market” by American economist and Special Assistant for National 
Security Affairs  to President Lyndon B. Johnson, Walt W. Rostow depicted 
the Tenessee Valley Authority (TVA) as an example of a development strategy 
for developing countries. Rostow argued that the development of these 
countries and consequently their involvement in the world market was only 
possible through an effort such as TVA. Accordingly, agriculture should be 
rendered more efficiently and the problem of imbalance between cities and 
villages should be countered. For this end, the private sector is auxiliary to the 
government, yet in a rather important position determining the opportunities 
and prices of the market by itself or by collaboration with the government.35 
However, it was much later in the volumes, namely in the first issue of 
the fifth volume, which is the latest year of the magazine’s publication,  that 
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the editorial office, run by the Turkish journalist Doğan Poyraz made a 
comment about development in the third world saying,  
If we put aside the prevention of war and the destruction of the 
environment, there is no goal promising bigger hope for a bigger 
number of people around the world than economic development... I find 
it quite encouraging that this main principle dominates the latest 
writings on economic development: it is not true that the countries 
would absolutely benefit from economic development unless it helps 
them cover their basic human necessities such as jobs, health, education 
and social justice. Therefore, success should be measured by the higher 
standards of living and not by higher statistical numbers.36 
 
In issue 3 of volume 1, the unknown author the article, “Economic 
Structure of America”, declared that the notion of the US as an example is not 
one that has been imagined by the US or Americans, but accepted by a global 
audience of peoples: “Developed and developing countries, communist or non-
communist nations looks up to American living standards as a necessary 
purpose to achieve. Goethe’s famous words a century ago, “Amerika, du hast 
es besser,” perfectly asserts the universal belief that the humankind can 
materially and mentally create a brand new life in the US.”37 
The author went on to explain that developing countries could take the 
US as a model for development reminding the reader that the US started from 
scratch as a country as well:  
Recently, especially since World War II, American experience 
has been attractive for the newly developing countries. This attraction 
does not only come from the developing countries’ deep interest in fast 
economic development, but also their reminiscence of the US as a new 
nation struggling until a short time ago to set up a politically working 
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constitutional system and to turn a financially simple agricultural 
economy  into a developed industrial economy.38 
 
Although the American economic system seems attractive as a model, the 
author warns that the economic system does not stand alone but rather there are 
supportive social and political elements providing the existence of the 
economic structure. Therefore, the whole American lifestyle should be taken as 
a model if one aims to achieve success with the economic system. 
However, in issue 2 of volume 2, historian Cyril E. Black said in his 
interview titled  “There Is No Such Thing as Abrupt Modernization” that the 
US could help other countries by being an example/ a model of the level of 
success that these countries would like to achieve on the way to becoming 
developed countries. Although the US would inspire these countries with its 
modern institutions working on rational principles rather than on traditional 
principles that might not apply to the current system, the countries should be 
careful to take the example and adapt it to their own conditions, because the 
cultural and historical conditions of a specific country might not work well 
with the American system if it was to be adopted as is. He insisted that “the 
system cannot be exported as a whole.” 39 Therefore, the magazine included 
different interpratations of how the US should be a model to other countries, 
while keeping the idea of the US as a model at all times. 
In the article, “Three Conditions of Development,” James S. Killen 
gave the blueprint of development for the developing countries in three 
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elements, namely “the ability to accept change, modernization of the education, 
and the impact of government.”40 By “impact of government” Killen meant 
that the impact of the government should not be felt except for some social and 
economic duties and that the government should allow the free market 
economy to run.”41 
In his article “Over-population,” the president of the World Bank, 
Robert S. McNamara added a third element to these conditions of 
development, mostly in the form of a warning, saying that developing countries 
should avoid high population growth that they cannot support. He warned that 
the equation “the higher the population, the bigger the prosperity of the 
country” is a myth and that it certainly did not apply for developing countries 
even though it might for the developed.42 
In the first issue of Volume 5, the president of Overseas Development 
Council, former vice president of AID and president of the AID programs in 
Turkey and Ceylon, James P. Grant also referred to McNamara’s opinions on 
the population problem of the developing countries saying that the main 
problem of these countries was the increase in what McNamara called 
“marginal men” who became adults but did not or could not serve their 
country. Grant pointed out that  
The impact of the population explosion on employment has been 
aggravated in most developing countries by an equally unprecedented 
migration from the countryside to the cities, by the use of increasingly 
capital-intensive technology and by financial policies favoring use of 
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capital rather than labor. At the same time, living standards are rising 
rapidly for a sizable segment of the population. This sharpens the 
contrast between those who are relatively well off and those for whom 
the present system is not working at all... It is probably no accident that 
many of the most severe of these upheavals in recent history have 
occurred in countries with the highest level of unemployment. 43 
 
However, Grant did not think that the situation was hopeless. He said 
that the developing countries had the means to fix the relationship between 
capital and labor, through raising the interest rates by devaluating the exchange 
rate. In this way, poor countries could help farmers and small entrepreneurs in 
particular to increase their savings. At the same time, governments of these 
countries should support labor intensive enterprises more and capital intensive 
ones less. He gave Japan as an example that had implemented and benefited 
from this advice.44 
Grant asserted that in all the big cities of developing countries, a 15-20 
percent unemployment rate became a common problem. This rate was even 
higher among young people, especially the educated ones, which resulted in 
the problem of brain drain.45 Deputy Director of Population and Nutrition 
Projects Department of World Bank, George B. Baldwin claimed in his article 
“Brain Drain or Overflow” that the major portion of the ‘brain drain’ is in 
reality the ‘overflow’ of talented people who cannot be put to efficient use in 
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their own countries.46 The reason for this was that “there is a great pressure on 
each country to expand university education and many has achieved to do so. 
As a result, the number of university graduates (including those who has 
graduated from vocational fields) increased more rapidly than the economies of 
these countries could absorb.”47 
Baldwin also gave Turkey and Iran as two “most interesting” examples 
of braindrain. He wrote  
Both countries have had a high number of students in foreign countries 
(most of whom covering their own expenses) and the university system 
of both is rapidly expanding. We also witness a common problem in 
both, which is the accumulation of professional work force usually in 
one or two cities and as a result, there is a lack of desire for some jobs 
(especially in the field of medicine) and there is the problem of ensuring 
that educated people live and work in rural areas. Therefore, just like 
many countries in Latin America, Turkey and Iran thus face an even 
more serious problem of a type of brain drain than much of the attention 
gathering brain drain to foreign countries. consequently, both Turkey 
and Iran are wonderful examples to developing countries in having 
well-planned, well-managed and highly successful programs for 
bringing their citizens abroad back home to work at “modernized” 
domestic institutions, especially at universities and hospitals.48  
 
Therefore, the problem of brain drain was a problem only so much as the 
developing country could not increase the demand for a highly qualified work 
force, which could be achieved by continuing efforts to develop. So 
development itself was the cure to this problem and this issue was never 
mentioned again in the whole series of articles Ufuk published. 
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Besides the problems of developing countries, in the article 
“Development with Social Justice,” a scientist working on political issues for 
the United Nations International Development Committee, Edgar Owens 
admitted that there were also mistakes made by the planners and theoricians of 
development on the way to development. He argued that first of all 
development was bound to happen in different ways and at different rates in 
different times and countries. believing in the uniformity and unversality of 
development was an overall mistake. He went on to say that “The first mistake 
is... the hypothesis that the fastest way is to build large factories in urban areas, 
to equip these with the most modern machines, and to turn to agriculture in the 
form of huge mechanized farms... They claimed that small companies are less 
efficient than big companies.”49 
Owens also agreed on the opinion that the capital intensive investment 
in low income countries was a mistake due to the fact that these countries were 
rich in labor force but poor in capital. Therefore, choosing the latter would 
create more employment which would bring about social justice and 
development. Accordingly, the goals should be as follows: 1) increasing 
employment, not economic development (this development would eventually 
come as a side effect) and 2) supporting the small producer. He also suggested 
that development started with the market towns and if there were none around 
the producers to bring their products to the market, then expecting development 
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to occur under these conditions was unrealistic.50 He claimed that “as the 
conditions under which small producers thrive, these producers would work 
more than they do now... I think when millions of people in the developing 
world can say ‘we are doing it ourselves’ and only then, the problem of 
development will be solved.”51 Therefore, he suggested that the solution for 
developing countries was to take small businesses into the system, not to 
exclude them, and he accepted the responsibility of the planners in 
development efforts. 
The magazine also referred to foreign aid, though less extensively than 
the other aspects of development. In one of the only two articles on this 
subject, professor of economics Raymond F. Mikesell advised that the foreign 
aid programs should be long term programs (at least 15 years) so that the 
developing country could slowly deal with the payments and that there would 
be constant capital flow to the country, since this was what the US did when it 
was a developing country itself.52 In the other article, Canadian President 
between 1963-68 Lester B. Pearson warned that the fact that a country 
provided aid to a developing country did not give it the right to intervene in the 
latter’s domestic politics, while also agreeing that the payments should be more 
relaxed.53 
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Apart from opinion pieces by economists, politicians etc Ufuk 
published two articles which can be considered more official opinions on 
development. One of these is by the United Nations Development Program 
Director Paul G. Hoffman, who previously ran the Marshall Plan. The article 
titled “Future is Full of Promise” is the transcription of Hoffman’s farewell 
speech at the United Nations General Assembly on 14 October 1971. In the 
speech he explained how the special fund for development was established 
under the United Nations in 1959, of which he was the director. He said he 
believed that giving direct aid to developing countries did not suffice unless 
they were also provided with the necessary skills to run their own development 
programs using their own sources: 
citizens of these countries needed help with the acquisition of the skills 
and knowledge to control their own development, especially the 
domestic sources that would back up this development. Only in this 
way can these countries be economically and politically independent 
and take their places in tje world community... They needed to acquire 
scientific and technologic abilities too.54 
 
While also accepting problems such as unemployment, pollution and health, he 
insisted that these were all solvable problems.55 
In “Two Opinions on Economic Development,” the United Nations 
Director of Latin America Economic Commission David H. Pollock explained 
two reports on development prepared by Praeger, written by two different 
authors. One of whom was Lester B. Pearson – former President of Canada and 
an academic owning a Nobel Peace Prize – and the other was Raul Prebisch – 
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“the Argentinian spokesman for the underdeveloped world and as once 
described by the Washington Post ‘independent enough to take Che Guevara as 
a source.”56 The Pearson  Report, titled “Partners in Development,” was 
published in 1969 and the Prebisch Report, titled “Change and Development – 
Latin America’s Great Task,” was published in 1971. Interestingly, while 
Prebisch avoided attacking rich countries unfairly for their responsibility in 
development of the underdeveloped countries, Pearson did the same for poor 
countries. both insisted that development should be taken as a whole plan, so 
that it would work as a system. If some steps were implemented but others 
were neglected even the ones implemented would be less efficient. Therefore 
programs should be well-planned in a spirit of teamwork between developing 
and developed countries.57 
In all the articles on development, one of the most important elements 
of the American system that was to be adopted by developing countries was 
education. In an article titled “The Education of the Scientists,” the authors 
Christopher Jencks and David Riesman asserted that “The university is clearly 
one of the major elements of the American culture. The existence of most of 
the American intellectuals still depends on the university. Indeed, anyone who 
is a member of the upper-middle class believes in the necessity of having a 
university degree and preferably a higher degree.”58 As for the quality of 
higher education, Jencks and Riesman claimed that “grad schools are... better 
than their counterparts in other countries; these are indeed models for other 
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people around the world.”59 The above mentioned article “Economic Structure 
of America” made an explanation of how the American education worked in 
comparison with other countries’ education systems: Other countries obliged 
students to make their educational and career decisions much earlier and as a 
result the education of the individual was not as extensive as it was in the US 
(not to mention the system’s rigidness which allowed no room for turning back 
to academic life). Every child in the US graduated from high school at the age 
of 18 and only then was he/she supposed to choose whether or not to continue 
with his/her academic endeavors in accordance with the principle of equality of 
opportunity. According to the editor of Fortune Magazine Charles E. 
Silberman, the American higher education system which was adopted by other 
countries “has achieved to provide intellectual perfection and skills of creative 
science in an atmosphere of mass education.”60 This article was one of the 
leading criticisms of the American education system and was very popular and 
famous at the time it was published. Columbia University Professor of 
Economy Eli Ginzberg wrote that accordingly the second decade of 
development programs focused on a creating domestic labor force, especially a 
qualified labor force, while the first decade was mostly about the flow of 
capital flow from rich countries to less rich ones. In order to achieve that, an 
emphasis on education systems, student exhanges and scholarships occured.61 
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The magazine also mentioned the children’s television program Sesame 
Street, which was exported to Turkey in the 1980s as well. The program is 
introduced in the magazine as an “experiment of education through 
television”62 and it was highly appreciated by the authors E. Horwitz and J. 
O’Connor, and according to them, by children, parents and teachers not only in 
the US but also in over 30 countries around the world for giving a chance to 
children who could not afford to get a good education. 
However, this positive attitude changes when it comes to comments on 
the behaviour of the youth and student activism. Most of the authors were 
convinced that the education system should change in various degrees from 
completely to minor finetunings. This will be further discussed in subsection 
3.1.6 Youth and Explanation of Student Activism, although it is important to 
note here the change in attitude. All in all, with the choice of articles, the 
magazine seemed to support an idea of adopting the American education 
system in terms of its qualities in providing a skilled and better workforce, 
company directors, and overall wellbeing of the newly developing economic 
system. However, it also did not deny that there must be disadvantageous 
aspects of this education system since it produced the youth that were revolting 
for misguided reasons and in the wrong way according to adults. 
Besides asserting that the US could be a good model for other countries, 
especially for developing countries, the magazine also included articles 
explaining why the Soviet system would not work for these countries, such as 
one written by the professor of economics and former president of the 
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American Political Science Association, Charles E. Lindblom’s article 
“Redefining the Market.”63 In this article, Lindblom argued that developing 
countries needed the market mechanism, simply because they would not be 
able to develop by big investments and limited consumption as done by the 
Soviets. This system worked for the Soviets because firstly they were able to 
limit consumption, thus obliging saving, by taking up violence as a means to 
do so. Secondly, the Soviet Union was already on the way to becoming a fully 
developed country, highly industrialized and obtaining great food source. 
Developing countries did not have these advantages therefore they could not 
successfully imitate the Soviet example. In other words, “The Soviets way is 
closed.”64 The article “Turkey and The European Economic Community” 
described Turkey as a country which “has been linked to Europe with political, 
economic and cultural ties for centuries and aims to achieve economic 
development in the Western world in a fast way.”65 Therefore, Ufuk, once 
again strengthened the idea of alliance between Turkey and the West and the 
US, while conversely appreciating Turkey’s rejection of the Soviet values and 
system. 
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3.1.2 American Dream, American Exceptionalism and American 
Character 
 
Under this theme, the magazine aimed to explain what the US was like 
as a country, who an American was, what kind of values the American society 
had and what kind of political/social/economic system the country had. By 
doing this, the magazine tried to introduce the US first hand to the audience in 
order to create an understanding of the US on the Turkish side and perhaps 
persuade the audience that it was the best system to adopt, while at the same 
time putting the US on a pedestal so that the audience would be persuaded of 
its power.  
In the article “Economic Structure of America” that was mentioned in 
the previous section, the American was “a new man” and the article suggested 
that it was a better man too, implying that the United States was a better nation 
than the Old World nations, which were static and lacked the dynamism of the 
US: 
Crevecoeur saw the economic opportunities in America in a very clear 
way: The French man who made the statement that ‘Here, the fruits of 
people’s effort is in direct proportion with the work he does,’ also asked 
the following question: ‘How can a poor European immigrant feel 
loyalty for his old country where he had nothing?’ ... He also saw that 
the American abundance depends on deeply humane foundations. In his 
writings, he said ‘Here, people from all nations melt together to make a 
new race... The American is a brand new man living with new 
principles; therefore he is inclined to have new ideas and new 
opinions.’66 
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This passage clearly states the American exceptionalist idea, while also 
suggesting that the US was inclined to do even better in the future, thus 
emphasizing the belief in American Dream. 
In issue 3 of volume 1, Peter Schrag, the author of Paradise Lost, 
searched for an answer to the question “What is American?” or “Who is an 
American?” through the autobiography of Willie Morris, the author of My Dog 
Skip, in the article “Local Roots”. In this search, he described the “American” 
as dynamic and constantly on the move, which helped shape the US into what 
it was, and the US as an ever changing and improving new place where people 
built up a new reality:  
America, in its profound meaning, is a product of the romantic and 
escapist imagination of the European. Many people, who have come 
here, could not find what they anticipated, but what these people 
anticipated and their desire to believe in that anticipation turned what 
was present into a new reality: everywhere the reality is changed to 
match the imagination when possible. The belief in change may be the 
biggest American characteristic.67 
 
Therefore, Schrag claimed that the immigrants who went to the US with 
an American Dream in their minds could find the opportunity to either realize 
their dreams or find another dream to satisfy themselves, bending reality into a 
shape they desired since the US was not a rigid but a dynamic and progressive 
country. Schrag generally described the “American” as someone who is a 
mixture of general ideologies and beliefs, and local thoughts and beliefs. 
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In volume 1, no.4, the Polish journalist and novelist Leopold Tyrmand 
recounted his observations about the US. As an outsider, his first observation is 
about the size and variety of things in the US. He is amazed with the 
“incredible” amount of the variety of products and the resulting conspicuous 
consumption. 
He asserted with amazement that the US is as big and colorful as it is 
seen in Hollywood movies. It is no use to compare anything in the US with 
European measurements. Tyrmand claimed that attempting to do this is 
“ridiculous” even. He comments on the negative opinions or prejudices over 
the “American Dream” saying that the Europeans are wrong about their 
negative convictions, supporting the recurrent idea in the magazine that the US 
is not a cruelly competitive society, where only the biggest amounts of success 
gets the individual the acknowledgement he needs to belong in the society. 
According to the same conviction, those who cannot achieve this kind of 
success are left out as failures. He claims that this is true only to the extent that 
the US is a  very big country, where every social act appears bigger than it 
actually is: 
The general conviction over America among Europeans depends on the 
imaginary belief that the inable of this kind cannot belong in America. 
This belief comes especially from the letters to the relatives in the Old 
World by their successful relatives in America. In European 
perspective, success in America is achieved through the impact of the 
effort for it and not through the volume/amount of the effort. And in 
America, impacts can be pretty stupendous.68 
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Tyrmand asserted that the average person in the US is a multidimensional 
character, knowledgable in the fields of literature, music and stage arts by 
reading and frequently attending concerts whether or not it is related to his/her 
career. He regards this as a “cultural revolution.”69 
However, what he admired the most was the moral values of the 
American people: 
For example, the greatness of the person. I personally never liked 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt. I personally never liked Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt. But he was such a great person and did a lot for his country. 
I am not one of his fans, while I can never deny his greatness, especially 
after seeing his monument in Washington... on a modest quadrangular 
stone these words are written: ‘In memory of...’ The greatness I am 
talking about here should not be taken as only the modesty of 
Roosevelt. I am also talking about an American society, who could 
accept this modesty. If the relatives of Gladstone, Bismarck, 
Clemenceau or Lenin had attempted to remember and commemorate 
these great men in such a way, all hell would have broken loose. In this 
case, greatness comes to life in perfect simplicity. This type of 
simplicity has been seen in many American institutions and great 
American statesmen. One of the main American values is this 
simplicity and it is rarely known and appreciated in Europe.70 
 
While appreciating the embracing power of American society and 
claiming that he does not feel like a “stranger” in the US, Tyrmand also 
asserted that the US is the “city upon a hill” and has a feeling of a duty to be a 
model for those who are below itself. He also appreciates this American 
exceptionalism and wants the American culture to be a global culture: 
American society was established with a fusion of pragmatism and 
materialism, but at the same time a certain type of idealism and a 
feeling of duty and responsibility against the world had had an 
important place in this society. Quakers, Woodrow Wilson, UNRRA 
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and Peace Corps represent the other side of American materialism... I 
hope that this kind of work will help the development of a strong 
American universalism.71 
 
Pragmatism is also mentioned as “the American” trait in Vol. 2.2 in 
relation to William James as the “Philosopher of Opportunity.” The author of 
the article Richard W.B. Lewis describes Pragmatism as the philosophy of 
potentiality/opportunity pointing out to the significance the philosophy gives to 
the freedom of opportunity, therefore rendering it distinctively American, and 
William James as “the man of a terrific and surprising future.”72 
Another “American” concept that is emphasized in the magazine 
repeatedly is the city. The city as a concept reflected the American Dream, 
because it represented a world of opportunities. The famous Jewish-American 
writer Alfred Kazin, wrote about the connection between the concept of the 
city and literature in Vol. 2.3 and argued that just as the American Dream 
becomes a nightmare when the individual does not succeed in achieving it, the 
city becomes a source of disappointment, disillusion and trouble that begs for 
discussion instead of an experience to share.73 On the other hand, New York 
University professor Irving Kristol wrote that the city symbolized different 
things for Americans and Europeans and that the city for Americans was a 
melting pot of culture, where all immigrants and people from lower classes 
started their lives and blended into the American lifestyle, while for Europeans 
it was an inseparable part of the person’s identity. City was not the final 
destination for the American but was a pool of labor force, who would like to 
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live in more peaceful rural areas as soon as they managed to earn the money to 
do so. The success of the city, therefore, could be measured by the amount of 
migration from the city to the suburbs. Kristol asserted that this amount was 
rapidly increasing for black people and it would continue on this trend until the 
end of the 1970s.74 
As the above mentioned concepts and traits suggest, the important 
umbrella concept of the American culture which is emphasized in all volumes 
and numbers of the magazine is the freedom of opportunity, something which 
could not be found in communist countries as the magazine also liked to 
emphasize. The US was a place full of freedom in every aspect, freedom of 
opptunity being one of the most important. Therefore, the US sembolyzed a 
place away from determinism as the journalist John Kettle in his article “Future 
Is Not Inevitable” asserted. There were infinite possibilities in the US and the 
future could now be foreseen so that it could be changed in need, which 
granted the US the responsibility to be a model by shaping futures in the best 
way possible.  
Freedom of opportunity was an old ideal in the US that dated back to 
the first Europeans on the American continent. America was a new frontier 
when it was first colonized and when the US was founded. The economist 
Robert L. Heilbroner wrote that “in Canada, the concept of frontier was 
considered in a more defensive way and encouraged the central government to 
expand its authority,” while in the US it was considered as a new horizon and 
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encouraged a small government so that people could pursue their goals. 
Therefore “it is not a coincidence that while one culture [the US] produced the 
cowboy as the first ‘hero’ of the frontier, the other produced the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police to implement laws.”75 Now, however, there was a 
need for another frontier which could offer new opportunities to people. This 
frontier was likely found in space. Therefore, space research and studies, 
especially the moon landing is glorified in the magazine as something which 
could provide new opportunities to humanity. For example, in vol. 2.1 the 
magazine published colored photos of the moon landing, which are the first 
photos in the magazine as a whole, and Archibald MacLeish, one of the 
authors, asserted that the moon and space is as much the frontier as America 
was in the past and that a new generation of people and culture could rise from 
this frontier.76 In Vol 2.3, the writer of 2001: A Space Odyssey Arthur C. 
Clarke regarded the trip to the moon as a challenge to the power of humanity, 
which in this case was overcome. Just like MacLeish, he predicted that this 
new place will be the source of new people and a new culture, perhaps “a new 
Renaissance.”77 Therefore, the magazine turned something very scientific and 
complicated for an ordinary person into something legible and more simple by 
creating an analogy between the space and the US. 
However, the emphasis on freedom of opportunity did not mean that 
everyone was free to do what they pleased at the expense of others’ well-being. 
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The rector of Haverford College John R. Coleman wrote in his article 
“Economy as a Flow” that the most important aspect of the American economy 
was that most economic decisions were given in a decentralized way so that the 
rivalry between companies could continue, which would enable companies, 
and thus the American life, to develop. According to Coleman, “most of the 
Americans live well though not like they do in Hollywood films” and he was 
convinced that “only those who are controlled by the competition of others 
with the same goals can aim for the stars.”78 However, he also stated that 
“Most Americans would feel little discomfort from achieving goals such as a 
competitive society, persistant prices, high level of employment, a higher rate 
of development and fair distribution of income at the expense of some 
freedom.”79 
Even American arts can be considered to offer new perspectives, thus 
new opportunities, to people in that art is made more for society in the US than 
it is in Europe. For example, in Vol. 2.2, art critic Harold Rosenberg argued 
that the New York school of arts represented the American arts with prominent 
painters such as Jackson Pollock and Willem de Kooning and that this is a new 
kind of art inviting people in, not standing in front of them.80 In Vol. 2.4, art 
critic Hilton Kramer argued that the center of art had been replaced from Paris 
to New York. New York was the new center of modern art.81 The USIS’ 
emphasis on the New York school and the arguments over it being the latest 
and best way of conducting art reflected their USIS strategy of presenting the 
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US to the world. Likewise, American music is also open to new possibilities 
with its experimental, pluralistic and progressive characteristics, which are 
qualities associated with the US. In the article “New Directions in American 
Music,” Daryl D. Dayton wrote that the most serious compositions of 
American music were starting to be created through the use of every kind of 
audio tool, using new techniques of musical notes, playing classical 
instruments in new ways, using electronic voices, etc.82 
Although progressive, creative and innovate, “the main feature of the 
American voter is being average” wrote the director of Washington D.C. 
Research Center for Elections Richard M. Scammon: “This mass of people are 
not only middle aged and middle class but also fairly educated and fairly smart. 
University diploma is not a rule. For most Americans secondary education is 
the average education level.”83  
Finally, one of the most important comments on the US under this 
category is the idea that the next big revolution would take place in the US. 
Director of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs of Columbia 
University and former Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey’s advisor, 
Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote in “The Future of the United States” about two 
revolutions previously in the United States. One of which was the United 
States Declaration of Independence and the other was the abolition of slavery. 
He asserted that the US was a dynamic country and now it had begun to be 
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even more open to taking examples from other developed countries in the 
fields of political revolution and social restoration.84 The French philosopher 
Jean-François Revel then wrote in the same issue of Ufuk that the US was the 
only country that was not wrapped up in out of date social and religious 
philosophies and therefore the only country that could feed creative change and 
revolution in the world: 
United States benefits from an increasing rate of development and 
economic prosperity, without which no revolutionary project can achieve 
success; technology is adequate there and they do fundamental research at a 
high level; it is culturally headed to the future rather than the past and it has 
been experiencing a revolution in the acceptance of individual rights and 
equality; it rejects authoritarian control, increases creative initiative in all 
mental fields, especially in arts, lifestyle and emotion, and it allows 
different subcultures, which complete each other to exist together... There 
are five types of revolution, which should either occur at the same time or 
they do not occur at all. These are political revolution, social revolution, 
technological and scientific revolution, revolution of culture, values and 
norms and international and interracial revolution. United States is the only 
country I can see these organically happening at the same time to constitute 
a single revolution.85 
 
 
3.1.3 Democracy 
 
Democracy is one of the key themes used by Ufuk Magazine to promote 
a positive image of the US. The magazine defined the ideology of the country 
placing the concept of democracy at the center of this ideology. In the articles 
that aimed to describe the basic institutions of the US, such as the Congress 
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and the judicial system, democracy or the significance attributed to it is 
presented as the central aspect of these institutions. For example, in Vol. 1.2 
James MacGregor Burns wrote about the importance of the checks and 
balances between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the 
government and the highly authoritative powers of the states as opposed to the 
ideally small central government. Burns argued in the article that thanks to this 
system of separation of powers there is no power that cannot be resisted or that 
can turn into a dictatorship, which distinguishes the US from other types of 
governments in that it grants more democracy and freedom to its society.86  
In the magazine, the definition of democracy hinges on freedom of 
speech which is a strong argument for promoting the positive image of the US 
as opposed to the communist countries, especially the Soviets, where freedom 
of speech was nonexistant. For example, in Vol. 1.2, John Brademas argued 
that the role of the intellectual is “to think critically of the status-quo and not to 
become its servant. In the end, he may or may not attack the accepted politics. 
However, as an intellectual, his primary duty is to interrogate into it.”87 
Likewise John Updike said in his interview that “what an author needs the 
most is intuitive honesty. The author should raise his fist to reject everything 
that has been lazily accepted, hastily understood, or religiously expected” and 
gave J.D. Salinger as an example to this.88 
In another article titled “Mass Media in the US,” Vice President of the 
Newspaper Association of America Leo Bogart wrote about the importance of 
                                                     
86
 James MacGregor Burns, “Congress Against the President,” Ufuk 2, no.1: 15-21. 
87
 John Brademas, “Intellectuals in American Politics” Ufuk 2, no.1: 25-34. 
88
 John Updike, “Realism, Melodrama and the Novel,” Ufuk 2, no.4: 80. 
61 
 
the level of freedom of speech in mass media. He asserted that Edward R. 
Murrow contributed to the deposition of Senator Joseph McCarthy through a 
critical tv documentary. According to Bogart:  
When compared to those countries where radio (or even media) 
is owned by the government, the American media system which is 
owned by the private sector tends to offer various things from which the 
customer can choose, since the capital would always flow to marketable 
new products and technics. In a free market, many and various 
innovations come up due to the competition between the old and the 
new, and after their period of trial, new tastes are born.89  
 
Therefore, this system guarantees an ever-changing, ever-improving 
atmosphere unlike the other alternative, mentioned above, which is a recipe for 
a static atmosphere. 
Brzezinski also argued in his article that  
Modern America is a society, which criticizes itself more 
sincerely and expects more from itself compared to other countries. 
National reports demonstrating social failures, ruthless criticism of 
national flaws, hard efforts in social control – all these demonstrate a 
national mood of self-examination and rationalism... The American 
tradition of freedom of speech and the freedom in expressing inapproval 
of something has been an important factor in developing this openness 
to change.90 
 
Brzezinski thus stated that freedom of speech was one of the most important 
elements in the development of American society. 
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On this subject Ufuk also had articles on the American judiciary system 
which apparently guaranteed a fair trial for everyone regardless of social status 
and race, and which was independent from the government91. The government 
provided a free attorney for poor citizens so that they could have a fair trial and 
decisions were made with the help of a jury, which was a positive element of 
the American judicial system (although sometimes confusing for other 
nations).92 The Supreme Court is especially of note on this issue due to its 
ability to outlaw acts of congress and the executions of laws. This guaranteed a 
system of checks and balances as stated earlier.93 
The last point in this category is the election system, which allowed 
American people to freely decide who they would like to have as a president 
and more importantly which allowed them to direct the politicians to 
whichever way they would like.94 
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3.1.4 Justification of the American Interventions and Presence in Europe 
and Developing Countries 
 
This category deals with both the American economic and military 
presence in European countries and developing countries. The focus is mostly 
on the American presence in European countries both economically and 
militarily and on the Vietnam War; with multinational companies and their 
benefits for the countries’ development and world peace. Later on in the 
magazine, this section deals with US relations with the European Community; 
and with the isolationist trends in the US and why this trend could not and 
should not continue to be the actual foreign policy of the US. The sensitivity of 
the Turkish political scene to the US military presence in Turkey is part of the 
aforementioned 1966 report as well. Therefore, by explaining the reasons for 
American presence especially in Europe, the magazine also indirectly 
explained the reasons for the same presence in Turkey,  which was mainly the 
threat of Soviet aggression. 
According to economist Robert L. Heilbroner’s data in his article 
“Multinational Companies and National Government,” 62 of the biggest 100 
American companies had facilities in at least 6 other countries, the US 
exported goods and service amounting to 43 billion dollars in 1966 to various 
countries, and in the same year the total amount of the overseas exports of 
factories and facilities in foreign countries owned by Americans was 110 
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billion dollars, more than double the amount of American exports.95 Due to this 
heavy American economic presence in Europe, “people are afraid that the US 
will dominate the whole market.”96 However, as it was stated many times in 
various articles in Ufuk, this was an unnecessary concern, firstly beacuse the 
system worked both ways and it was not only the US that had a strong presence 
in the foreign market, but also Europe had a strong presence in the European 
American market too. According to Dr. Louis Hacker, “even in 1929 the total 
amount of foreign private investment in the US was 8.900.000.000 dollars”97 
and this was due to the amount of freedom and assurance the US provided to 
foreign companies so that they were always sure that they were safe in the 
American market. Heilbroner also stated that “what Europeans see as an 
American challange can also be considered as a European challenge against 
American companies for European companies expand their production both in 
Europe and in other countries faster than all sales of the American giants (both 
at home and abroad).”98 Journalist J.J. Servan-Schreiber claimed in his article 
“The American Challenge” that the US was about to conquer the European 
market with its investments but this actually contributed to European technical 
development since the US was superior in every field from industry to 
education.99 He wrote, “what we are experiencing today is not an example of 
classical imperialism, but a mechanical occurance. It is a an overflow of power 
due to the difference of “pressure” between the North America and the upper 
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parts of the world including Europe”100 and it was a natural occurance since the 
Americans had “the ability to adapt to new conditions, flexible structures, 
creative teams.”101 Also the US invested directly in the companies of other 
countries which nearly covered the gap between the US and other countries and 
the US could get reimbursed for this after 6 years, or at times never.102 
Therefore, Ufuk promoted the idea that the American economic presence in 
other countries actually contributed to the development of these countries and 
that sometimes the US did not even benefit from this relationship. 
On the issue of multinational companies, although Heilbroner accepted 
that multinational companies had the opportunity to dictate more of their 
demands to the governments of developing countries, he also claimed that most 
developing countries would like foreign investment from Europe and the US in 
their countries. The reason why this was the case was that “multinational 
companies pay higher than domestic industries, keep more honest financial 
records, pay higher tax and provide more managerial education and know-how. 
These companies also offer better social service to their workers and provide 
great professional opportunities for a happy minority of the elite. Apart from 
this these companies are the main way the technology of the West enters into 
developing countries.”103 While Heilbroner asserted that the opinion of 
multinational companies as a catalyst for a new world system promoting peace 
as transnational institutions was a mistake because this opinion neglected to 
consider the gap between “the ‘western’ big cities and the ‘eastern’ countryside 
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of the underdeveloped world” and that multinational companies would most 
probably widen this gap rather than narrow it down. His is the only critical 
piece on the subject of multinational companies. Others in the magazine 
supported the former opinion.104 
In the later issues of the magazine, the articles in this category started to 
cover the relations between the US and the European Economic Community 
(EEC). In “The Common Market and the United States,” Robert M. Ball, 
Commissioner of Social Security between 1962-73, asserted that “the 
discomfort of the US about the EEC comes from the unfamiliar obligation of 
negotiation with an economically larger and in some ways even stronger 
creature than itself” and unfortunately this creature was “like a dinasour” in its 
reactions meaning the Community could not move into action without the 
collective work and decision of all member countries.105 Likewise in another 
article, president of the Ford Foundation and advisor to presidents Kennedy 
and Johnson, McGeorge Bundy said in a speech at the Conference on Foreign 
Relations of the EEC that  
It was easy to urge the  crucial importance of Europe and the necessity 
of the unification of the West Europe in 1962. The two fears which kept 
this simple doctrine alive significantly decreased in time and lost their 
importance. One of these and the obvious one was the fear of the Soviet 
Union. This fear has decreased as we all notice, but most of us are also 
aware that it can show up again... But the other fear disappeared for 
good... I am talking about our secret fear of Germany.”106  
                                                     
104
 See Neil H. Jacoby, “Multinational Corporations,” Ufuk 4, no. 3: 36-46, originally from 
Corporate Power and Social Responsibility (New York: Macmillan,1973) and Frank 
Tannenbaum, “Beyond National Government,” Ufuk 3, no.2: 45-49, originally “The Survival 
of the Fittest,” Columbia Journal of World Business 2 (March/April 1968), no.3. 
105
 Robert Ball “The Common Market and the United States” Ufuk 1, no. 5: 4. 
106
 McGeorge Bundy “The Common Market through the Eyes of an American” Ufuk 2, no. 5: 
15-16. 
67 
 
 
Bundy claimed that while these kept the US busy, Europe or the unification of 
Europe was not an immediate goal to pursue, so that while in theory the US 
supported this, it did not actually put much effort or thought into it. Now that it 
happened, Bundy went on, the US was glad that it did but at the same time 
worried that all the fundamental relations would change. However, he said that 
Europe is still very important for the US because most of the US investments, 
trade and dollars were still in Europe.107 Moreover, Robert Ball asserted that 
“despite these problems on the surface there are inevitable common interests 
and responsibilities. In the future the US and the Community will share the 
responsibility of shaping the monetal policies and trade of the noncommunist 
world” and the following is especially of note since it summarizes the position 
of Ufuk Magazine: 
And despite the difficulties of working with a Europe whose interests 
are no longer an extension of ours, the US should understand the 
political importance of an economically robust and ever expanding 
European Community. Would we like West Germany to pursue 
Ostpolitik on its own, or as a member of the European Community? 
What would please us more: the labor unions dominated by French and 
Italian communist parties and communists to roam freely in a 
fragmented Europe or in a more moderate prosperous society?108 
 
All in all Ufuk seems to suggest that US relations with the EEC would be better 
after a period of adaptation and that there was nothing to fear about this. 
Ufuk’s articles on the military presence of the US in other parts of the 
world reflected a need for buffer zones and the continuity of relations so that 
                                                     
107
 Ibid, 13-14. 
108
 Ball, 13-14. 
68 
 
world peace could continue. In order to do this, the world needed transnational 
institutions such as NATO, which is defended and supported in many articles. 
Also these articles explained why there was an American presence both in 
Europe and and in Vietnam, why this presence needed to continue and that 
Europeans knew that the US troops were there for their own good and that they 
actually would like them to stay. For example, in “NATO Looks Forward,” US 
permanent representative to NATO, Robert Ellsworth wrote  
What the French President Pompidou said in Washington this 
Tuesday is noteworthy... ‘We believe that the American presence in 
Europe is desirable and necessary... This should not be just symbolic, 
but its amount should be tangible.’ And only yesterday did German 
Chancellor Willy Brandt declare that his government would do the best 
they could in order to keep the American troops in Europe.109  
 
Then he went on to explain why Europe was important for the US and thus 
why the US could not possibly withdraw forces from Europe: “If Western 
Europe is not safe, the United States is not safe either... The idea that urged the 
President to say ‘We cannot leave Europe as much as we cannot leave Alaska’ 
applies for Belgium, Norway, Germany, Turkey and all NATO allies as 
well.”110 McGeorge Bundy also supported the idea that the safety of the US 
was inseparable from the safety of Europe, therefore, it was natural for the US 
to have military presence in Europe, especially now that nuclear weapons were 
not useable due to their power of destruction, and unilateral disarmament was 
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even more impossible because then the apparent balance between the Soviets 
and the West would break, which was considered dangerous.111 
In Volume 3 Issue 2, Elliot R. Goodman explained that the sensitivity 
over this issue mostly came from the Soviet propaganda against the American 
presence in Europe and the existence of NATO, according to which these two 
were the barriers against the detente. To this sentiment, Goodman answered as 
such:  
Soviet leaders want detente; but a detente in their own terms... 
According to the Soviet approach, detente is compatible with engaging 
in big military adventures as long as it does not require using nuclear 
weapons or jeopardize the Soviet Union. In other words, if there is a 
detente between the East and the West, there is also an expansion of the 
area of engagement between the super powers.112 
 
The few articles on the Vietnam War focus on the post-war economy and 
how the US could go through this transition period. The articles all settled on 
the idea that while for some American sectors the transition will be hard, for 
most others it will be smooth and even the hard transition periods would be 
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tackled well with the US’ strong economy. Apart from the post-war economy, 
the only concern was to change the anti-American idea that the US was in this 
war just for economic reasons. The articles all asserted that the US economy 
was already strong and did not need the addition that would come as a wartime 
economic advantage. Morever, they insisted that the Vietnam War actually 
caused losses for the economy rather than gains, so this argument did not 
apply. There is also an apparent reassurance that the Vietnam War would be 
the last war of its kind, in that it was fought to protect the free world heroicly 
and all alone.113 On the other hand many articles were on isolationism and why 
it could not be pursued by the US since the world was smaller and more 
interconnected than before and isolation was not even a choice if the US would 
like to stay safe as stated by the Nixon Doctrine.114 This gave assurance that 
the US was there to protect the free world and had no interest in withdrawing 
itself from the system, because first of all it had its own security and economic 
interests in Europe and the developing world. 
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3.1.5 Defense Against Issues of Racial Segregation and Discrimination 
 
The articles under this category are few in number. In the first issue of 
the first volume, the article “Dangers of Democracy” stated that  
When one sees today’s conflicts, he can think that the American 
democracy is collapsing. In reality, the conflicts occuring in the cities 
are actions of those very few people who are interested in the disaster 
called Martin Luther King. Most of the black people are horrified by the 
violence as much as the whites, and many of them have been the victim 
of this violence.115 
 
The article “Economic Structure of America” that was mentioned before stated 
that the whole reason why there was a civil rights movement was that the 
government and/or the system in the US allowed or even encouraged it  to 
happen, which was a good feature of the democratic system as opposed to a 
totalitarian system that would not allow such a movement.116 This idea is 
repeated in other articles too.117 
The articles made great emphasis on how things were changing for the 
better for blacks, including the building up of experimental cities such as 
Columbia for blacks to live under better conditions, the changing 
representations of blacks in the media giving them more agency and 
sophistication, and appreciation for the abilities and culture of the blacks, jazz 
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and blues being the number one point of appreciation.118 However, two articles 
also went with the approach of blaming the victim and suggesting that the 
racial problems did not belong to the whites now that they supposedly did not 
discriminate or allienate the blacks, but it belonged to the blacks, since the 
blacks discriminated among their own community by feeling suspicion and 
hatred against the more prosperous blacks.119 Apart from the blacks, there is 
only one article on Native Americans and how they suffered from cultural 
difference when Europeans colonized their lands by the famous author N. Scott 
Momaday in the form of an excerpt from his novel The Way to Rainy 
Mountain.120 
 
 
3.1.6 The Youth and Explanation of Student Activism 
 
This subject reoccurs frequently in the magazine and there are several 
general points to make about the articles on it. One point the magazine makes 
                                                     
118
 See Ernest Dunbar, “Elegant, Disciplined, Beautiful...,” Ufuk 2, no.5: 46-52, originally in 
Topic (1972), no.69: 17-21; Frederick G. Dutton, “The Politics of the New Generation,” Ufuk 
3, no.4: 13-20, originally in Changing Sources of Power: American Politics in the 1970s 
(McGraw-Hill, 1971); Wolf von Eckhardt, “Two American Experiments,” Ufuk 1, no.4: 62-67; 
Isa Kapp, “Black and White Conflict,” Ufuk 4, no.3: 81-93; Irwing Kristol, “Urban Crisis and 
the Lower Class,” Ufuk 2, no.4: 41-45; Marion Merrill, “Columbia: The America of the 
Future,” Ufuk 2, no.4: 35-40; Richard M. Scammon, “The Real Majority: 1972,” Ufuk 4, no.4: 
45-52. 
119
 See Nathan Glazer, “Racist Behavior and the City,” Ufuk 4, no.1: 42-48; Martin Kilson, 
“Birth of the Politics of the Black,” Ufuk 4, no.4: 37-44. 
120
 See N. Scott Momaday, “The Way to Rainy Mountain,” Ufuk 3, no.3: 74-79. 
73 
 
is that the student activism of the 1960s and 1970s was just a trend among 
students. For example, Charles Frankel wrote:  
This is not to say that the students are managed from one place. 
I would like to state that the events are only some kind of student trend.  
Students match both their clothes and their actions. International trends 
can spread fast through television. Student leaders gain reputation 
overnight. Successful student boycotts and defeatist actions are 
immediately broadcasted to students in other countries.121  
 
According to Frankel, students were pushy and impatient in nature. While he 
accepted the benefits of their actions as pushing for quicker development, he 
also refuted the seriousness of the issue by claiming that the events were only 
the results of a worldwide trend and nothing more. He evaluated the students as 
“kids” and not adults, making them “others” to the adult world, which 
automatically decreased the effects they might have in that world.122 He also 
claimed that “they do not know what they want either. They want revolution 
for the most part but they do not know what they exactly want; at the same 
time they want the student demands to be listened.”123 Some articles also 
asserted that the most radical students were a very small group and that they 
were not appreciated or accepted by their fellows as well. Most of the other 
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students according to this claim were still conservatives and even the liberals 
were very uncomfortable with the disruption in education caused by these 
radical students.124 Some claimed that most radicals were also the members of 
the elite class, who had no other battles to fight and who were not actually 
familiar with the real conditions of society nor the workings of politics.125 
Another group of articles insisted that this was not the students role to play, 
they were supposed to study, not create political change.126 
As for the reason for the way the students behaved, the most prominent 
factor explained by the articles is the lenghty period of education that students 
needed to go through to achieve their goals, which broke off their links with 
the society they lived in. Other possible explanations were the fact that the 
students had not encountered the long and hard wars and depressions that their 
parents had, thus making them demand more from an already good system, and 
also the influence of mass communication.127 
In general, these articles tried to illustrate a small group of students, who 
did not even have a consistent ideology, trying to destroy the already well-
working traditional institutions. While some of the articles tried to give the 
message that they were fighting in vain and actually damaging society and that 
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they had better work in the system to demand and achieve their goals,128 the 
most important message the magazine gives to the audience is a message of 
relief that the events were just temporary and should not be taken as a serious 
threat. 
In order to make these points, Ufuk made use of articles by successful 
students from prestigious American universities including Harvard. The 
selection uniformly consists of conservative students, such as Steven Kelman 
from Harvard, who supported the idea that there is no place for radical activism 
at universities. 
 
 
3.2 Anti-Communist/Anti-Socialist and Anti-Soviet Propaganda and 
Defense of the Capitalist System 
 
One of the most important aspects of the Ufuk Magazine articles is that 
they reflect a strong feeling of disturbance by the image of unrestrained market 
economy in the US as it was stated in the 1966 Memorandum: “In trying to 
correct the commonly held 19th century image of American capitalism, more 
attention might be paid to the significant regulatory role of the government in 
the US economy and the many public social welfare programs.” Therefore, the 
articles emphasizing that precautions are being taken for the economy in the 
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US to protect small business, that capitalism in the US is not cut-throat but 
more regulated than before, that it has been adopting the practical aspects of 
socialism so as not to leave any need for full-blown socialism make up the bulk 
of each volume. However, the articles are careful to not emphasize the material 
richness of the US despite the emphasis on the market economy. The market 
economy is emphasized mostly in terms of the democratic values it 
represented, such as freedom of opportunity and the chance for development it 
offered to the developing countries. Therefore, many articles in the Ufuk 
Magazine aimed to explain and/or defend the United States, while they also 
made tremendous effort to explain and/or defend capitalism. The general 
message of the articles was that the US was a capitalist country and would like 
to clear the reputation of capitalism so that the actions the US had taken could 
be rationalized/justified. This effort is evident in many Ufuk articles. Although 
in one case the author of “The Economic Structure of America” denied the 
association of the US with capitalism saying that “The economic experience of 
the United States cannot be defined with any ‘ism’s, slogans or simple 
theories,” the same author made an effort to explain the structure of the US 
economic system and went on to say that capitalism was way ahead of 
communism and instead of labeling the systems as such, one should consider 
the promises of the two systems in terms of living standards and whether or not 
those promises were kept.129 He also made a historical evaluation of the 
capitalist system deciding that capitalism was not the unbridled cruel system as 
it was used to being considered. Especially now, the government had a “moral 
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responsibility” against the society and was in charge of regulating the system 
for progress and improvement. Anti-trust regulations and laws were a proof of 
this. Another proof was social security which was provided by the government 
and more so than the social security which was offered by socialist 
governments: “In 1967, the public spending of the federal government and 
state and local administrations rose up to 240 billion dollars, which is 31% of 
the national output. This percentage is twice the one in officially socialist 
countries such as India and Mexico.”130 
Moreover, American laborers had the right to strike and lockout, which 
meant that they had a voice in the system unlike those in communist or fascist 
countries: “In nondemocratic (fascist, communist or despotic) countries, labour 
unions are established and run by governments and in these countries strikes 
are prohibited by law.”131 
In this way, the author argued, the US adopted the pragmatic aspects of 
socialism so that there would be no need for socialism itself. Furthermore, 
socialism could never be a strong movement in the US because “the American 
economic system has already provided the future promises of socialism. Thus, 
getting rid of poverty and creating social equality are almost already achieved 
goals.”132 Therefore, the fact that there was social equality and upward 
mobility in the US and that with the help of the civil rights movement soon the 
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blacks would gain their demands all showed that the model to follow was the 
American model, not socialism.133 
The author of “Economic Structure of America” also explained taxing in 
the US in comparison with the taxes implemented by socialist governments as 
a way of demonstrating with statistical data why the American system was 
better than the socialist/communist system: 
The meaninglessness of the words such as capitalism, socialism, 
collectivism and communism is apparent when the domestic politics of 
the countries are checked out. For example, many socialist governments 
does not implement as high stages of taxes as it is done in the 
“capitalist” American society... In the Soviet Union, income tax stages 
rises only up to 13%; more than 80% of the government’s income is 
obtained through indirect sales and transfer taxes, which damages the 
low income class the most. There is no inheritance tax. These 
communist governments, who are implementing this financial politics, 
in fact follow the track of what the capitalist countries had been doing 
60 years ago by putting pressure on the low-income class by sale and 
transfer taxes and taxing consumption instead of production.134 
 
An idea repeated in the magazine several times by different articles was 
that communism/socialism was dying and/or there was too much reaction 
against it by even socialists/communists themselves. According to this 
argument there was no way to revive or fix this either. This idea sounds like a 
message to the developing world that socialism was not the system that they 
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might want to invest in, since it apparently did not work, although it had 
offered so many promises in the beginning.  
The threat of communism and the dangers of having close relations 
with the US was also one of the points made in the 1966 Memorandum: “Make 
clear that while the present degree of East-West detente permits a cautious 
degree of cooperation, it must be based on genuine Bloc reciprocity, and that 
despite the current thaw, the self-proclaimed objectives of Communism are 
inimicable to Turkish interests.” In order to achieve this aim, the magazine 
chose to publish articles on small communist countries under Soviet rule, and 
on how they experienced an economic and social backward trend instead of 
developing. Czechoslavakia was the choice of example in these articles.135  
In only two articles did the magazine directly attack the Soviets for being 
dangerous to the free world and for having the determination to do whatever 
they could in order to keep their “empire” intact and/or expand this empire. In 
these two articles, the Cold War jargon is clear; the Soviet Union is the enemy 
of the free world and the US is the protector and superpower of the free 
world.136 In addition, in only one article did the magazine state distrust and 
suspicion over another country, namely China. While China’s efforts to 
communicate with the free world was a positive thing, it still received 
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suspicion on the US side because China’s actions did not represent an approach 
of truely friendly relations.137 
 All of these articles were pointed towards the target group in order to 
show them the continuing danger of communism and the USSR. At a time 
when Turkey was not as much disturbed by the Soviets in terms of ideology 
and politics as before, USIA needed to remind the audience of these dangers. 
This would prevent Turkey from getting closer to the USSR and contain the 
communism in its existing boundaries. 
 
 
3.3 Cultivating a Consciousness of Globalism 
 
This subject is first covered in the 3rd issue of the 2nd volume of the 
magazine with Robet F. Ellsworth’s “The Future of the Atlantic Pact.”138 
Ellsworth discussed in this article the importance of NATO, of decreasing the 
tension between the East and the West, of protecting the environment, and of 
keeping technology under control. 
Later in Volume 3 Issue 1 the magazine published some articles on this 
issue as a special section, because NATO had set up a committee named “The 
Challenges of the Modern Society (CCMS).” Seven pilot projects were 
approved one of which being a project to address air pollution in Ankara. 
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These articles covered environmental subjects such as environmental pollution, 
ecology, recycling, the reason for the importance of these subjects and 
solutions to these issues. 
Later on Dr. Kay H. Jones wrote in “International Cooperation for Clean 
Air” the results of this project along with the results of two other projects in 
Frankfurt and St. Louis:  
The results we had in Ankara were promising. The Scientific and 
Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK) had started four 
surveys on decreasing the air pollution before the CCMS project... CCMS 
project accelarated these surveys. The measurement stations built during 
the project are still being used. In the meanwhile, the Turkish government 
set up an energy council. More importantly than all these, the project was 
advertised enough to the public to create an awareness of air pollution 
control in this country.139 
 
Jones also suggested that these results were important not only for developing 
countries but also for developed countries, because environmental pollution 
was a problem for both. Sharing the results of these projects was also important 
for creating a spirit of alliance between countries on the subject. 
All in all, articles under this category demonstrate the new awareness of 
a small and interconnected world, which can be transcribed as a consciousness 
of globalism.140 Therefore the US made efforts to protect this one world from 
further pollution and destruction. 
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Other than these major categories of writings, there are some articles on 
cultural aspects such as arts and music. Those articles which cover cultural 
aspects are mostly focused on high culture rather than popular culture. This 
may be a reaction to the anti-Americanist opinion that the United States did not 
have a sophisticated culture of its own. There is major emphasis on museums, 
galleries, painters and literary figures, while popular culture elements such as 
blockbuster Hollywood movies are usually downplayed unless they made a 
point about a current issue such as racial relations in the US. Art is also 
important because it makes a showcase of freedom of expression in the US. 
Ufuk Magazine is especially filled with commentary on modernist forms of art, 
which was apparently appreciated in the US, an aspect that furthers the notion 
of freedom of expression. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
Turkey and the US have never been enemies, although relations 
between the two countries have not always been unproblematic. Especially in 
the 1960s the two countries started to have a problematic relationship due to 
such problems as the Cyprus Crisis and the Turkish poppy seed production and 
trade, as well as the domestic political and social changes in Turkey, which 
influenced the way Turkey approached its relations with the US. In the 1960s 
and 70s the Cold War had come to a point where both sides, namely the US 
and the Soviet Union, asserted the requirement for detente. Therefore, as other 
countries around the world, Turkey was looking for more multilateral foreign 
relations including relations with the Soviet Union. US-Turkey relations had 
been criticized for Turkey’s overcommitted attitude towards the US, while the 
US did not show the same commitment to the interests of Turkey. All these 
created an unfavorable US image in Turkey, especially in the minds of the 
urban elite, which was USIA’s target group for its public diplomacy activities. 
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As a result, and in an attempt to continue relations with Turkey in a favorable 
manner for the US, USIA observed the need to adapt its objectives and 
program to the new political conditions of Turkey. Among these objectives 
were increasing the elites’ awareness of the advantages of Turkey’s association 
with US-sponsored security institutions, namely NATO and CENTO, 
explaining the reasons and importance of the American presence both in 
Turkey and other parts of the world, making special emphasis over Vietnam, 
raising the level of understanding of the benefits of economic cooperation with 
the US and the West, while also reminding the elite that the political and 
intellectual dangers of the Soviet Union still prevailed. 
In this study my aim was to provide examples of how USIS in Turkey 
implemented these objectives. For this end, I made use of interviews with the 
former USIS officers in Turkey, which revealed the actual field work 
remembered by the officers and most importantly the official USIS publication 
Ufuk Magazine prepared for the purpose of accessing to the target population, 
namely the urban elite, which clearly presented the way USIS intended to 
portray the US in order to ameliorate the US image in the minds of the Turkish 
elite. Among the material used in this magazine were articles by well known 
writers, social scientists, philosophers, artists and politicians including 
President Nixon. The focus of the magazine content followed the line of the 
USIA objectives mentioned above, although going even further in some 
subjects such as cultivating an awareness of globalism among its audience. All 
in all, when we examine the issues we can see that the magazine achieved to 
portray a favorable image of the US in terms of its chosen content. 
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However, one question still remains to be answered. Were the USIS 
efforts of public diplomacy including the magazine able to win the hearts and 
minds of the Turkish elite? A look at the fight between the political factions of 
Turkey, namely the Right and the Left, over their opinions of the US, which 
continued to the 1980 military coup, indicates that there was hardly any change 
in the “hearts and minds” of the public. General knowledge of Turkish politics 
also suggests that the fight between the politicians, policy-makers and 
academics, which were the target group of USIS Turkey, went on the same 
way and anti or pro-Americanism was still an issue of conflict and accusation 
in the quarrels between the right and the left of the urban elite. In other words, 
despite all the USIS effort, American presence in Turkey and such actions as 
the arms embargo, which especially for the leftists represented the US opinion 
of Turkey as a client state rather than an ally, therefore alarming Turkish 
sensitivity over its sovereignty, remained as one of the most cited issues by the 
elite in their domestic propaganda against each other. This presents us an 
American image that generally did not change for either one of the factions. 
It is also important to notice the political awareness of the public in 
terms of both domestic and international issues. Student movements is an 
apparent example of this awareness together with the near “awakening” of the 
less educated members of the society due to developments such as the 
expansion of electricity, roads, telephone and most importantly the radio to 
Anatolia, where such an awareness did not previously exist. These 
developments allowed Turkish people to have an opinion of the US of their 
own (or as an expansion of their choice of political parties). As a result, those 
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who had anti-Americanist tendencies used phrases such as “American lackey” 
against those who were pro-American. The mere existence and prevalence of 
this rhetoric shows that being for or against the US is a point in determination 
of one’s political faction, thus a strong sentiment in Turkish political rhetoric. 
Turning this awareness back was not possible and the point USIA missed was 
that although it was the targeted small group of people who made foreign 
policies, the same people needed to please their voters more than ever at the 
same time. Therefore, targeting only the elite population seems fruitless 
compared to a mixed program targeting the other population groups in Turkey. 
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